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Articles
WHY D'OENCH, DUHME? AN ECONOMIC,
LEGAL, AND PIUHLOSOPICAL CRITIQUE OF
A FAILED BANK POLICY
RICHARD E. FLINT*

But the goat chosen by lot . . . shall be presented alive before the
Lord to be used for making atonement by sending it into the desert as
a scapegoat.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1942 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case of
D 'Oench, Duhme, & Co. v. FDIC2 establishing an equitable estoppel under the
umbrella of federal common law3 to protect the insurance fund of the Federal

* Professor of Law, St. Mary's Law School. University of Texas at Austin, B.A., 1967; Ph.D.
(Economics), 1971; J.D., 1974. The author expresses his gratitude to Dean Barbara Aldave of St.
Mary's Law School for her continued and generous support of faculty research endeavors. The
author acknowledges the Hugo Anton Engelhardt Law School Memorial Trust Fund for financial
assistance provided during the preparation of this article. The author also thanks his research
assistant Walter Corrigan. Finally, the author appreciates his family's (especially his wife's)
tolerance during the preparation of this article.
1. Levitcus 16:10 (New International Bible). Under Hebrew law on the Day of Atonement
something more than just a sin offering needed to be made to preserve the purity of the nation. The
reason for this was that the sin offering did not atone for all sins, but only for those done
unwittingly, in ignorance. The scapegoat was a male goat selected by lot, whose purpose was to
carry the remaining sins of the people beyond human habitations. Id. at 16:22. Thus, the scapegoat
provided the means for the full release of sins and the purification that God demanded. The
procedure required the High Priest to lay his hands on the live goat [the scapegoat] and confess all
the inequities, transgressions and sins of the people of Israel, and then push the scapegoat off to the
wilderness where it carried all the sins of the people of Israel. See generally R.A. BARCLAY, THE
LAW GIVERs 40-41 (1964). In contemporary America, a scapegoat is the one who is made the
object of blame, the fall-guy, or patsy. ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 86 (4th ed. 1978).

2. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
3. Id. at 458-59 (implicitly applying federal common law as a matter of public policy). The
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson explicitly asserted that the decision was an application of
federal common law. Id. at 468, 475. Although Justice Brandeis had earlier pronounced that
"[t]here is no federal general common law," Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), it is
undisputed that in areas that require federal solutions or they involve uniquely federal interests
federal courts have the power to create rules of federal law which have not been expressly suggested
by federal enactments. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1979)
(holding that because the SBA and FHA perform federal functions in their respective loan programs
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from secret agreements between
borrowers and banks which misrepresented the value of a bank's assets. 4 In the

and derive their authority from legislative acts, federal interests were sufficiently implicated that
federal common law controls their lien priority rights); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (in a case involving the obligation of the government to inform an endorser
of a payee's forgery on a federal check, the Court noted that in the absence of congressional
guidance a federal court could fashion a federal common law rule). See also Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (arguing
that the only limitation on the power of a federal court to fashion a federal common law rule is the
existence of "a federal enactment, constitutional or statut[ory], that it interprets as authorizing the
federal common law rule"); Alfred Hill, 7he Erie DoctrineinBankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1013,
1050 (1953) (stating that federal common law applies "only in effectuation of a policy derived from
the Constitution or from a valid act of Congress"). Judge Friendly described those areas sufficient
for the creation of a body of [federal] decisional law to be limited only by the "grant of federal
jurisdiction .. .adorned with a bit of legislative history." Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 413 (1964). In Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964), the Court referred to the D'Oench case as
involving the judicial protection of a "uniquely federal interest ....the ultimate statement of which
is derived from a federal statute." Adorning federal common law with the cloak of statutory
rationalization has exacerbated the difficulty courts have had in attempting to circumvent such
rulings.
4. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 457. Writing for the majority Justice
Douglas stated that the deposit insurance legislation revealed "a federal policy to protect respondent
[FDIC] and the public funds which it administers against misrepresentations as to the [value of)
securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which respondent insures or to which it makes
loans." Id. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the case.
Today the issue of valuation of the assets of financial institutions is of substantially more interest
and concern because issues of bank solvency justifying intervention by a receiver generally revolve
around book value not market value. See Kenneth E. Scott, DepositInsuranceand Bank Regulation:
The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW 907, 918 (1989) [hereinafter Policy Choices] (noting that the
banking supervisors as a discretionary action determine closure "around the time of book value
insolvency"). See also Smith v. Witherow, 102 F.2d 638, 640 (3d Cir. 1939) (noting that
insolvency status of a bank should not be determined by "the theoretical state of its balance sheet
which may include assets whose actual value is far less than that at which they are carried on its
books"). The use by financial institutions of book values instead of market values to determine asset
valuations leads to substantially more actual losses in market value terms upon insolvency. See
Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance- The AppropriateRoles for State and Federal Governments,
53 BROOK. L. REv. 27, 36 (1987) [hereinafter DepositInsurance].
Although the term insolvency is not defined in the banking statutes, statutorily it encompasses
both the inability of a bank to meet its obligations as they mature and the closing of its doors. 12
U.S.C. § 191 (1989). See also FDIC v. Goldberg, 906 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 (5th Cir. 1990) ("An
insolvent bank is, by definition, one that lacks sufficient assets to pay every claimant in full.")
(footnote omitted). The Comptroller of Currency, who has been entrusted with the superintendency
of national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1989), is authorized to make the determination of insolvency and
appoint a receiver for national banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192 (1989). The FDIC becomes receiver
for insolvent national banks as a matter of law. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1989). Under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 [hereinafter FIRREA]
(codified at scattered sections of 12, 15 and 26 U.S.C.) the FDIC now has the authority to appoint
itself receiver of state chartered banks, although it is also empowered to accept appointment from
state authorities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)(3)-(5) (1989). When a bank fails and the FDIC is appointed
receiver, it has two separate roles to perform. In its corporate capacity, as insurer and administrator
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last fifty years the D'Oench doctrine5 has been greatly expanded by the courts.6

of FDIC insured banks, it is obligated to protect insured deposits. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811, 1818,
1819, 1821(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). While in its capacity as receiver for a failed institution
the FDIC has the statutory duty to "preserve and conserve the assets and property" of the failed
institution and to "pay all valid obligations' and "insured depositors". 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(2)(D),
(d)(2)(H), (f) (1989).
5. For purposes of this article the term D'Oench doctrine will be all encompassing - that is,
it will be used to refer collectively to the D'Oench case itself, the interpretation given the case by
subsequent courts, section 1823(e) [12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989)] and the interpretation given the
section by the courts, and the burgeoning federal common law area of holder in due course. The
author is well aware of the explicit and subtle differences between these divergent legal approaches
to protect the insurance fund administered by the FDIC, but is of the opinion that for the purposes
of this article they may be treated as one, for each is part and parcel of the erroneous failed bank
paradigm discussed in this article. See infra notes 94-144 and accompanying text. For a recent
article containing a detailed discussion of the differences in the three related legal concepts see W.
Robert Gray, Limitations on the FDIC's D'Oench Docrine of Federal Common Law Estoppel:
CongressionalPreemption and Authoritative Statutory Construction, 31 S. TEX. L.J. 245, 249-58
(1990).
6. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) ("the absence of bad
faith, recklessness or negligence . . . does not preclude application of the D'Oench doctrine");
Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1529 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 954 (1991)
(D 'Oench precludes alleged defrauded borrowers from bringing action under federal securities law
against FDIC and its assignees, even if FDIC had prior knowledge of claim); Porras v. Petroplex
Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1990) (extending D'Oench doctrine to assignees of the
FDIC); Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1990),
cer. denied, 111 S. Ct. 244 (1990) (D'Oench protections extend to bridge bank that takes over
operation of failed bank); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989) (doctrine applies
even if "borrower does not intend to deceive banking authorities."). During the expansive growth
of the doctrine courts have relied upon the original opinion as authoritative precedent by virtue of
the doctrine of stare decisis, without any analysis of whether its major premise - preservation of
the insurance fund - had or continues to have any valid justification. For an interesting discussion
of the distinctions between precedent as informative analogy and precedent as authority see RICHARD
A. POSNER,

THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 89-98 (1990) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE].

Posner's insights are useful in understanding the underlying normative issues involved in the use of
precedents. He noted:
[t]he use of cases as informative analogies must be distinguished from their use
as authorities, that is, from the policy of decision according to precedents - . . . .
Paying attention to precedents thus does not commit one to stare decisis; the issues of
authority and analogy are distinct. . . . But unless a precedent is authoritative in the
sense of announcing a major premise that cannot be questioned, it can be a source only
of data that are anecdotal in character or of reasons, considerations, values, policies.
The distinction between legal precedent as information and as authority may seem
to overlook the fact that the values, considerations, policies, and ethical insights found
in previous decisions of the same or a coequal or a higher court are entitled to greater
weight - are more authoritative - in the decision of the present case than are the values,
considerations, and so forth that might be gleaned from other sources.
Id. at 89-90, 93-94. The problems generated by bad authoritative precedent are well known. In
fact, Shakespeare once mused:
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error, by the same example
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Its purported legislative counterpart, 7 Section 1823(e)' has enjoyed similar

Will rush into the state.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, sc. 1 (Richardson ed., 1923).
7. It was not until 1950 that Congress enacted what is often erroneously referred to as the
codified counterpart of the D'Oench doctrine. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-797, § 13(e), 64 Stat. 873, 889 (1950) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1950), as amended by
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989)).
Such enactment did not actual codify D'Oench, as the specific
requirements of section 1823(e) are not mentioned or eluded to in the case. See, e.g., Kilpatrick
v. Riddle, 907 F.2d at 1529 n.2 (Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he often recited statement
that § 1823(e) is a codification of D'Oench, Duhme does not bear analysis."); Gray, supra note 5,
at 250-52 (noting that while section 1823(e) is widely regarded as a codification of the doctrine, he
sees it as merely a clarification and extension of the doctrine); Marsha Hymanson, Note, Borrower
Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer When Banks Fail,62 S. CAL.
L. REV. 253, 269 (1988) [hereinafter Hymanson] (asserting that the statute partially codifies the
D'Oench doctrine). Cf. Robert W. Norcross, Jr., The Bank Insolvency Game, FDIC Superpowers,
The D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Common Law, 103 BANKING L.J. 316, 328 (1986) (asserting
that the legislation was an attempt to limit the scope of D'Oench).
8. The statute reads:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in
any asset acquired by it under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as security
for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be
valid against the Corporation unless such agreement - (1) is in writing, (2) was
executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest
thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset
by the depository institution, (3) was approved by the board of directors of the
depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the
minutes of said board or committee, and (4) has been, continuously, from the time of
its execution, an official record of the depository institution.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989). It is clear that the specific requirements of 1823(e) are not provided,
nor for that matter, are they mentioned in D'Oench. The initial legislative history of section 1823(e)
was silent as to congressional intent. H.R. REP. NO. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3765, 3774 [hereinafter FDIC REPORT] (reflecting only that the entirety of section
1823 related "to authority of the Corporation to make loans or purchases of assets of banks to avert
losses was amended" to prevent agreements from diminishing the right, title, or interest of the
Corporation unless satisfying the four specified conditions). A statement made during the floor
debate could be said to support the proposition that the intent of the section was to restrict D'Oench.
81 CONG. REC. 10,732 (1950) (Representative Walters concluded "[ilt was never the intention of
Congress to give to the Corporation a stronger position than that of the bank and the adoption of the
amendment, my amendment is offered to prove heretofore it was the intent of Congress that any
agreement in the absence of fraud is binding on the Corporation."). Of course, recourse to
legislative history is necessary only if the statutory language is ambiguous. Furthermore, to the
extent that legislative history may be considered, it is the official committee reports that provide
more authoritative expression of legislative intent. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
One court, after reviewing what it viewed as the legislative history, determined that it was not
congressional intent that section 1823(e) apply to all defenses, only those contemporaneous, secret
and unwritten. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1985) (the
section does not bar defenses that are independent of any "side agreement"). This narrow
interpretation of the reach of section 1823(e) has been rejected. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86,
94 (1987) (holding that the statute bars even fraud in the inducement which renders a note voidable).
But see Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)
(holding that claims making an entire transaction invalid from its incipiency are valid under the
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0
expansion. 9 More recently, courts have even created a fiction by holding
that the FDIC enjoys rights as a holder in due course under federal common law
as a necessary extension of the original D'Oench doctrine." One consideration

section).
In this author's opinion, if Congress had desired to remove the whole panoply of defenses it
would have expressly provided for that in the statute. However, in the absence of explicit
legislation, and assuming that it was the intent of Congress to impliedly bar most defenses, one
would logically expect that an extensive discussion would appear on the pages of the authoritative
legislative history. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and
debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed important,
and so likely to arouse public outrage."). As noted above no discussion of the extent or coverage
of section 1823(e) is contained in the legislative history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1950. The recent banking law reform legislation recodified section 1823(e) in substantially the same
wording, but extended its coverage to include protection for assets acquired by the FDIC in its
receivership role, as well as in its corporate role. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title 1, § 217(e),
103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989). The only passing reference to the purpose of this change noted in the
legislative history stated that the changes were designed to clarify the current provision and to make
it clear that the protection extended to all assets acquired by the FDIC in any capacity. H.R. REP.
No. 101-54 (i), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA REPORT], reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 131 (It should be noted that the House Report was discussing section 215(4)
of House Bill 1278 which was enacted as Section 217(e) of FIRREA). Furthermore, not one word
of congressional intent for these changes is found in the Congressional Record. FIRREA also
12 U.S.C.A. §
extended section 1823(e) coverage to the Resolution Trust Corporation.
1441(a)(b)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
9. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 91 (holding the term "agreement" for purposes of section
1823(e) broader than a mere promise). In Langley the Court extended the protection of the statute
to obligations of a failed bank procured through fraud in the inducement, and held that knowledge
by the FDIC of the misrepresentation prior to acquisition is irrelevant to the application of the
statute. Id. at 91-93. See also Vernonv. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[C]ourts
have referred to section 1823(e) and the cases interpreting it as guidelines for the application of the
D'Oench doctrine."); FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that the statute bars defense of oral misrepresentation as to scope and duration of
written guarantee). The application of Section 1823(e) to bar state law defenses has been upheld
against constitutional challenges based on the Fifth Amendment. See Chatham Ventures, Inc. v.
FDIC, 651 F.2d 355, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
10. By the use of the word "fiction" it is meant that the FDIC is given the status of holder in
due course under principles of federal common law even though few, if any, of the technical
requirements for application of the doctrine are satisfied. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1978) (specifying
the conditions for acquiring the status of holder in due course). In fact, one recent court stated that
the requirements of "for value," "without notice of prior dishonor," "without notice of contrary
claims," and acquisition in a non-bulk transfer, were mere technical state-law requirements that
"cannot be allowed to defeat the policy behind federal holder in due course doctrine." Sunbelt Say.
v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1991). Ironically the Montross court held that the
federal holder in due course doctrine did not extend to non-negotiable instruments. Id. at 358.
11. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
The Wood court determined that D'Oench and Section 1823(e) were intended to "clothe the FDIC
with the protections afforded a holder in due course," but that Section 1823(e) did not authorize such
status. Id. at 159 The Wood court then found such status for the FDIC in federal common law,
arguing that to permit the assertion of personal defenses stemming from the underlying transaction
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has, however, remained constant during this expansive development. The goal
sought to be preserved by this unbridled growth of the doctrine was the
protection of the insurance fund as an integral part of regulatory failed bank
policy.'" The core value inherent in this goal was, and continues to be,
economic.
Even before the collapse of the saving and loan industry, 3 and the

would prevent the FDIC from carrying out its statutory mandate in choosing a failure resolution
technique. Id. at 161. See also Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir.
1990) (extending the status to successors of federal agencies even though the technical state law
requirements for holder in due course status are not met); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1256
(5th Cir. 1988) (extending the federal common law status to the FSLIC). The application of the
holder in due course doctrine to bar state law defenses has been upheld against constitutional
challenge. See Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d at 1250.
12. This was, of course, the stated policy reason given by Justice Douglas. D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942). For the most part, however, courts have blindly
followed the doctrine, with little if any critical evaluation of the underlying economic or
philosophical values that are inherent in the professed underlying policy. See, e.g., FSLIC v.
Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (asserting that undisclosed conditions in the assets of
failed institutions are not the concern of the FDIC); FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1072 (1991) (applying D 'Oench and section 1823(e) even when the
results appear harsh or inequitable); FDIC v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 600 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(applying D 'Oench while noting that "on its face, such a policy may appear inequitable"); Campbell
Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d at 1249 (5th Cir. 1990) (extending the ambit of federal holder in
due course to FDIC and successors in a bulk sale); FSLIC v. Stone-Liberty Land Ass'n, 787 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1990, writ granted) (permitting FSLIC to raise D'Oench for the first
time on appeal). Contra Sunbelt Say. v. Montross, 923 F.2d at 358 (refusing to extend the holder
in due course doctrine to cover non-negotiable notes); FDIC v. State Bank of Virden, 893 F.2d 139,
143 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding setoffs accomplished before the assignment of a debt to FDICCorporate outside the protection of section 1823(e)); Olney Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Sav.
Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to permit assertion of section 1823(e) protections
for the first time on appeal); FDIC v. Republic Bank Lubbock, 883 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding section 1823(e) does not invalidate subordination agreement existing prior to receivership);
Astrup v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 886 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding D'Oench does
not bar tort claims).
13. The savings and loan fiasco motivated President George Bush only eighteen days after his
inauguration to announce a comprehensive plan to resolve the crisis. The result was the FIRREA.
At the time of its passage approximately twenty-five percent of the savings and loan industry was
in serious financial difficulty. See FIRREA REPORT, supra note 8, at 303, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 99. The insolvency of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
[hereinafter FSLIC] as a result of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980's is well documented.
See, e.g., id. at 304, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 100 (mentioning that the FSLIC was in a
deficit position of over $56 billion on December 31, 1988). FIRREA abolished FSLIC [12 U.S.C.
1725(a) (1980), repealedby FIRREA, Pub. Law 101-73, § 407, 103 Star. at 363 (1989)] and all of
its insurance responsibilities were assumed by either the FDIC or the Resolution Trust Corporation
[hereinafter RTC]. 12 U.S.C. § 144199a0(h) (West Supp. 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1989).
Recently the administration has asked for another $80 billion to clean up the savings and loan mess
in addition to the $80 billion already spent. Paulette Thomas, FDICExpects to be Insolvent by Year
End, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at 3 (Southwest ed.).
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increasing rise in bank failures, 4 the necessity for a change in the direction of
bank regulatory policy to deal more effectively with the problems generated by
excessive bank risk and its resulting negative impact on the insurance fund was
widely acknowledged." In fact, today it is generally recognized that the present

14. Between 1943 and 1974, fewer than ten banks failed in any given year. FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 101 (1990) (table 122). By contrast, 221 banks failed in 1988 and
207 failed in 1989. TREAs. DEP'T, MODERNIZINO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: U.S. TREASURY
DEPARTMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS, reprinted in Fed.

Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1377 (pt. E), at ch.I (table 1) (Feb. 14, 1991) [hereinafter TREASURY
REPORT giving the respective chapter and page number, except that reference to its conclusions and
recommendations will be hereinafter TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations]. See
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OPINION LETrER ACCOMPANYING 1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF

THE FDIC 3 (June 28, 1990) (noting that the "performance of the commercial banking industry
deteriorated in 1989 compared to 1988"). The GAO found that at the end of 1989 there were 1,109
problem institutions, thirty-five of which were in serious financial trouble and needed to be
recapitalized, and several others that could fail if regional economies continued to deteriorate. Id.
at 4. As a direct result of the increasing numbers of bank failures the FDIC's deposit insurance fund
has declined drastically. From 1987 through the end of 1990, the FDIC fund will have declined
from over $18 billion to about $9 billion. TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations,
supra, at I-11. William Seidman, chairman of the FDIC, has recently asserted that the FDIC will
be insolvent by the end of 1991. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 3, col. 1. See also TREASURY
REPORT, Conclusions andRecommendations, supra, at ch.I (table 1) (showing that in 1989 the FDIC
lost $6.090 million). This has motivated the FDIC to request an increase in its statutory authority
[12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (West Supp. 1991)] to borrow from the Treasury. See Paulette Thomas,

Seidman Raises Estimate of Size of FDIC Deficit, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at 2, col. 3
(Southwest ed.) (stating that the fund will need to borrow $50.2 billion by the end of 1991).
15. See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
145-65 (1985) (outlining six different proposals to deal with the excessive risk in the banking and
savings and loan industry including risk-rated premium and market-value accounting); Kenneth E.
Scott & Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposalsfor Federal Deposit
InsuranceReform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 886-94 (1971) (advocating classified variable premium
rates based on the individual risks facing a bank or savings institution). More recently, as the
economic problems generated by the crisis have increased in magnitude the level of debate among
academicians concerning how to reduce bank risk and provide a "safer banking system" has
heightened. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?,50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1161
(1989) [hereinafter Garten, Bank Failure](noting that the recent crisis has turned focus "on the cost
of bank failure to the bank insurance fund"); JonathanR. Macey, The PoliticalScience of Regulating
Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1277 (1989) (noting that the massive losses to the federal deposit
insurance has made "[Tlhe leading edge issue in banking law today is - or ought to be - bank
risk"). See also Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REo. 129, 131 (1986) [hereinafter Garten, Banking on the Market] (concluding
that depositor discipline does not cause banks to control their risk-taking); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical
Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REo. 215, 239 (1988) (asserting that empirical data supports the
proposition that depositor discipline can control risk-taking by bankers); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1153, 1172-93 (1988) (explaining how the FDIC's choice of a failure resolution technique
can exacerbate excessive risk taking); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987) (noting that the existence of deposit insurance creates a moral
hazard on the part of depository institutions giving them an incentive to take risk).
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regulatory structure and policies have encouraged the very risks that exacerbate
bank failure. 6 As a result legislative focus is moving from an emphasis on
failed bank policy (ex post) toward the development of healthy bank policy.

16. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel etal., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REv. 301, 314 (1987) (noting that federal deposit insurance creates incentives for banks
to make risky loans); Garten, Banking on the Market, supra note 15, at 172 (acknowledging that
"bank risk is increasing"); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in
Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 1183, 1183 (1990) ("It has long been recognized that a fixed-rate
deposit insurance system, . .. can pose a moral hazard to excessive risk taking"). Although
acknowledging the existence of excessive risk in the banking industry and the resulting possibility
of bank failure, academicians do not agree on the solution. The principal debate centers on whether
market forces or regulatory policies should be used to create an atmosphere to correct the problem.
Compare TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 10 (advocating
changing the scope of deposit insurance, increasing supervision of banks, and creating asset riskbased insurance premium to increase market discipline to reduce risk) and Stephen K. Halpert, The
Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481, 527-32 (1988) (arguing
that the repeal of the separation of the investment banking and commercial banking activities is
desirable to counter excessive risk taking) and Macey, supra note 15, at 1290-98 (positing that
current regulations [including the prohibition of investment banking, the pricing of deposit insurance,
and administration of failed banks which give creditors no incentive to control risk taking] subsidize
excessive risk taking by federal insured banks.) and Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 1154
(arguing that regulatory policies destroy market discipline as a method of controlling excessive risk
by banks) with Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market, supra note 15, at 172 ("greater reliance
on market discipline to reduce bank risk is likely to prove counterproductive") and Helen A. Garten,
Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
241, 249 (1988) [hereinafter Garten, Still
Banking] (asserting that market discipline can not control
risk taking by banks).
17. By "failed bank policy" ismeant policies and resulting government supervision of which
the primary focus is on the handling of problems generated by insolvency or other severe financial
condition of banks and the use by the FDIC of bank failure resolution techniques. FIRREA
enhanced the powers of the FDIC to stncture assistance to banks and to fund failed bank
resolutions, but its major failure resolution techniques remain the same: open bank assistance,
deposit payoff, and purchase and assumption transaction and bridge-bank transactions. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1821(d)(2)(F), (d)(2)(G), (f)(in), (n), 1823(c),(d) (1989). In a deposit payoff, the FDIC draws
from the insurance fund to pay the balance of all insured deposits. Open bank assistance involves
the use of loans and other techniques to prevent failure of a financial institution. These procedures
are used by the FDIC in its corporate capacity primarily in the case of banks considered to be "too
big to fail." The phrase "to big to fail" relates to those banks which the FDIC "is unwilling to
inflict losses on uninsured depositors and even creditors in a troubled bank for fear of adverse
macroeconomic consequences or financial instability of the system as a whole." TREASURY REPORT,
Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at [11-29. However, because of the costs such
a transaction imposes on the insurance fund, it is not favored by the FDIC. Id. at 1-34-37
(discussing the cost of several open bank assistance cases). The use of open bank assistance has led
to a generally FDIC policy of preferring uninsured depositors, i.e., those in excess of the insured
amount, over creditors. In fact uninsured deposits are routinely "insured" as a result of the
resolution techniques used by the FDIC in failed bank situations. Id. at 1-40 ("[Blecause the FDIC
has provided full coverage to uninsured depositors in very large bank failures [open bank assistance]
for the sake of financial stability it is difficult from the standpoint of fairness to inflict losses [in
purchase and assumption transactions] on uninsured depositors in smaller banks."). This special
protection of uninsured depositors has received criticism. See id. at I-31 (recommending that the
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(ex ante)." s This development reflects a growing realization that the present

FDIC use failure resolution techniques in large bank situations in such a way to impose losses on
the uninsured depositors); KANE, supra note 15, at 37 (noting that the FDIC shows "a de facto
commitment to minimize the risks of cumulative failures that surpass[es] their de jure commitment
to safe and sound banking"); Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 1181 (arguing that open bank
assistance weakens the banking system by taking away incentives for large depositors to monitor
risks). The failure resolution technique favored by the FDIC is the purchase and assumption
transaction, which can be viewed as "a merger or acquisition of the failed bank by a successful
bank, with the successful bank paying a certain amount for the goodwill value of the failed bank."
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 624 (3d ed.
1991). See also TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at ch. I,
(table 8) (showing that 805 purchase and assumption type transactions were undertaken during the
period 1980-89 out of a total 1098 failure resolution transactions). The advantages of a purchase
and assumption transaction are that it requires no immediate expenditure of FDIC reserve funds
because the assuming institution assumes the liabilities of the depositors, it avoids even the
temporary disruption of banking services, and preserve the "going concern" value of the failed
institution. See. e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 1183. A bridge-bank transaction involves
the creation by the FDIC of a limited-life institution [bridge bank] into which the insolvent institution
is merged through a purchase and assumption transaction. The bridge bank can continue operations
in the place of the failed institution until an ultimate purchaser is found. TREASURY REPORT, supra,
at 1-33. See generally Gunter v. Hutchinson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982) (describing a purchase and assumption transaction); Garten, Bank Failure,supra note 15, at
1163-65 (giving a brief description of these failure resolution alternatives); Macey & Miller, supra
note 14, at 1174-93 (containing a detailed pre-FIRREA analysis of various failed bank resolution
techniques). The use of failure resolution techniques by the FDIC are considered to be merely
exercises of the constitutional bankruptcy power [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.]. See Christopher T.
Curtis, The Taking Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
367, 372 (1990) ("Regulatory disposition of financially troubled banks and savings associations is
an exercise of the bankruptcy power.").
18. By "healthy bank policy" is meant policies and supervision focused on making banking
safer and more competitive by reducing the risks inherent in banking. See, e.g., TREASURY
REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 9 ("the most effective way to
minimize taxpayer exposure is through a strong, competitive, well-capitalized banking system.").
Healthy bank policy must, however, have a method for dealing with bank failures when they occur.
In such an event healthy bank policy focuses on a value-based approach to resolving the crisis, not
on a straightforward economic cost approach which is and has been the linchpin of failed bank
policy. Thus, the use of the terms healthy bank policy or failed bank policy is more than a mere
semantic argument, it is a matter of inherent underlying philosophical values. But see Garten, Bank
Failure, supra note 15, at 1161-62 (grouping "healthy bank policy" and "unhealthy bank policy"
together as components of bank failure policy for the reason that since not just badly managed banks
fail, bank failure policy cannot just focus on encouraging healthy banks). Garten argued that "bank
failure policy" is designed to facilitate rapid reallocation of banking resources following bank failure
at the minimum cost to the FDIC and its insurance fund. Id. at 1175, 1195-96. In this author's
opinion Garten's focus is misplaced and her approach is flawed, although it is consistent with the
outdated policies that have created the very crisis our country is now suffering. Garten's approach
begins correctly by identifying the underlying goal of bank policies - to provide a stable money
supply. But her approach lends justification for only those policies which achieve that goal at the
least economic cost - her overriding value. Healthy bank policy stresses methods of encouraging
accountability through better managed and supervised banks and the creation of disincentives for
excessive risk taking. The old adage "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" is
synonymous with the underlying premises of a healthy bank policy. In the event of failure, bank
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ex post regulatory policies have not only created liquidity problems for the
insurance fund, but have also placed significant social costs 9 on the public and
have led to increases in federal deposit insurance premiums for healthy banks.'
The erosion of public confidence in the banking industry has motivated
legislative interest in reforming the deposit insurance system,2' recapitalization

policy should focus on the plight of the depositors, creditors, and debtors in terms of social costs
and ethical values irrespective of the overall economic costs. Both this author and Garten see the
need for a stable money supply as an appropriate goal of governmental banking policies. However,
this author believes that the policies that achieve that goal are justified only if the underlying values
of commutative justice and accountability are encouraged and supported. For a detailed discussion
of these different approaches see infra notes 94-144 and accompanying text (failed bank paradigm);
and see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text (healthy bank paradigm).
19. The recognition of the existence of possible divergences between social costs and private
costs is largely attributed to the work done by A.C. Pigou. A.C. PRoOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE, pt 11, ch. IX (4th ed. 1932). By private cost Pigou was referring to the opportunity cost
to society of using an amount of input in one manner as opposed to another; while a private cost
referred to the cost to the firm of using the input. Id. at 134-35. According to Pigou divergences
between the two might result from external diseconomies related to the use of the input, such as
pollution of a stream by waste material from a factory. Id. at 183-88. Pigou argued that the
divergences needed to be measured so that the welfare of society from the use of the input could be
evaluated. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 28-42
(1960) (critically analyzing Pigou's theory). More recently, Richard Posner distinguished between
the two types of costs by saying "[A] social cost diminishes the wealth of society; a private cost
merely rearranges that wealth." RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (3d ed. 1986)
(hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC].
20. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendazions, supra note 14, at 34
(acknowledging the decline in consumer confidence caused by increasing taxpayer potential exposure
in light of failing banks and resulting losses to the federal insurance fund); FIRREA REPORT, supra
note 8, at 302, reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98 (noting the waning of consumer confidence
in the savings and loan industry). See also KANE, supra note 15, at 142-44 (noting that because of
the various political constraints, the President and Congress will see that taxpayers and well-managed
financial institutions will underwrite the cost of the Treasury Department's promise underlying the
deposit insurance guarantee). Macey and Miller have identified the parties affected by the
externalities of bank failure as healthy banks whose contributions to the FDIC and the then-existing
FSLIC insurance funds paid off depositors and ultimately the federal taxpayers whose taxes paid for
the FDIC administrative costs and would replenish the federal insurance fund soon when the funds
were depleted and borrowing from the Treasury was necessitated. Macey & Miller, supra note 15,
at 1162. In the case of present failed bank policies the divergences between private and social costs
have in this author's opinion led to an significant additional external diseconomy - a lack of public
confidence in bank regulation because of the inequities in D'Oench type legal proceedings and the
failure of regulators to seriously address the microeconomic issue of individual bank credit risk.
From a purely welfare economic standpoint society will be better served by policies that encourage
safer banks, than policies that wait to resolve bank failures with their resultant social costs.
21. See, e.g., S. 261 (Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 1991), 102d Cong., 1st Seas., 137
CONO. REC. S.1161-1167 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991); S. 713 (Financial Institutions Safety and
Consumer Choice Act of 1991), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S.3739- 3777 (daily ed.
March 21, 1991) (containing the Treasury Department's proposals for changing the banking industry
to deal with the banking crisis). These proposals seek changes in some of the basic structures of
the banking system and as a result are dissimilar to the original deposit insurance act which was
enacted as a "method of controlling the economic consequences of bank failures without altering the
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of that system," and structural reform in the nature of deregulation of financial
services. '
However, neither courts, legislators, nor academicians have suggested any
major reconsideration of one of the most misguided disciples of failed bank
policy - the D'Oench doctrine.' With the tidal wave of litigation involving
the FDIC, RTC,' and successor financial institutionsF attempting to collect
upon the improvident loans made by the collapsed industry as a means to
replenish the insurance fund,' serious focus needs to be given to D 'Oench, the

basic structure of the banking system." Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit InsuranceLegislation of
1933, 75 POL. Sc. Q. 181, 200 (1960) (noting that the bill was a compromise between those
advocating basic changes in the banking structure and those advocating no government intervention).
22. See, e.g., 5. 262 (Deposit Insurance Fund Assistance Act of 1991), 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. S.1170 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991).
23. See, e.g., S. Bill 263 (Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1991), 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 137 CONO.REc. S.1172-1180 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991).
24. Although there has been a recent flurry of articles, notes, and comments concerning
D'Oench and its progeny in the last few years, none have advocated its repeal and few have been
critical of any part of its present application. See, e.g., Jane D. Goldstein, Langley v. FDIC: FDIC
Superpowers - A License to Commit Fraud, 8 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 559, 580 (1989) (arguing
that extending holder in due course status to the FDIC needs an equitable exception); Gray, supra
note 5, at 300 (arguing for a restriction of the D'Oench case to its statutory counterpart); Steven A.
Weiss & Kenneth E. Kraus, D'Oench Protectionfor Private Institutions Assisting the FDIC: A
Necessary Component of Thrift
and Bank Bailout, 108 BANKING L.J. 256, 284 (1991) (concluding
that D'Oench protection extends to third parties); William A. MacArthur, Comment, Who Will Stop
the Rain? Repairing the Hole in the D'Oench, Duhme Umbrella by Protecting the FDICAgainst
Fraudulent TransfereeLiability Underthe Bankruptcy Code, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1271, 1335-36
(1991) (advocating extension of D'Oench doctrine to protect FDIC from fraudulent transferee
liability); Stephen W. Lake, Note, Banking Law: The D'Oench Doctrineand 12 U.S. C. § 1823(e):
Overextended, But Not Unconstitutional, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 315, 337 (1990) (asserting that
extending to the FDIC the status of holder in due course is an appropriate balance between the
protection of the banking system and the borrower); Hymanson, Note, supra note 7, at 319
(asserting merely that giving the FDIC the status of a holder is not consistent with the equitable roots
of the doctrine); E. Douglas Welch, Note, D'Oench, Duhme ProtectionsExtend to PrivateParties
Who Purchase a Failed Institutions's Assets From the FSLIC: Porras v. Petroplex Savings
Association, 903 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1990) 22 TEx. TECH L. REv. 237, 254-55 (1991) (noting that
the extension of D 'Oench protection to assignees may not bolster confidence in the banking system
but advocating no change).
25. The Resolution Trust Corporation was established by FIRREA to manage and resolve all
cases involving FSLIC-insured institutions placed in conservatorship or receivership between January
1, 1989, and the date of the enactment of FIRREA (Aug. 9, 1989) or to be placed into
conservatorship or receivership within a three year period following its enactment. 12 U.S.C. §
1441(a)(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
26. By successor financial institution is meant the financial institution which acquires all or a
part of the assets of the failed bank as a result of a failed bank resolution technique chosen by the
FDIC acting in its capacity of receiver of the failed institution.
27. Under FIRREA the FDIC became the administrator of two separate and distinct deposit
insurance funds: the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which was formerly the Deposit Insurance Fund,
which insures all BIF-member banks, and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) which
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Neanderthal of failed bank policy. This doctrine has its origin in the "fiscal
revolution"' which followed the Great Depression.' This liberal revolution's
macro-focus was on remedying the perceived evils of the then-existing economic
system in general. The solutions selected involved immediate and massive
government intervention, regulation, and redistribution of wealthe to solve the
nation's economic crisis and to rebuild public confidence. In the area of
financial services this philosophy led most directly to the separation of

insures the deposits of all SAIF-member savings associations (formerly a function of the FSLIC).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a)(5)-(7)(A) (1989). These funds are derived from assessments paid by the
member financial institutions based on a flat rate percentage of insured deposits [12 U.S.C. §
1817(b) (West Supp. 1991)] and, if necessary, from borrowing from the Treasury Department. 12
U.S.C. § 1824(a) (West Supp. 1991). A FSLIC Resolution Fund was also established by FIRREA
to deal with pre-FIRREA savings and loan liquidations to be managed by the FDIC. The fund
consists mainly of the assets and liabilities transferred from the FSLIC. 12 U.S.C. § 18219(a)
(1989). To the extent this fund is insufficient to satisfy the liabilities of the former FSLIC, the
Treasury Department is required to fund the difference. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(c) (1989).
28. The term fiscal revolution refers to the drastic and significant changes in policies about the
large aggregates in the national budget "as directed toward affecting certain overall characteristics
of the economy, such as employment and unemployment, price levels, and the total share of
government activity in the economy" that occurred during the New Deal. HERBERT STEIN, THE
FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 4 (1969) [hereinafter STEIN]. The revolution had the effect of
challenging the underlying values and related goals and policies of the alleged outdated laissezfaire
economic and political order and replacing them with policies that reflected an expansive role for
government in economic decision-making. Cf. William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance
in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REo. 195, 197 (1984) (noting that
banking law changes of the New Deal reflected a "pervasive belief ... that excessive competition
was a primary cause of the economic collapse").
29. The need for some level of government spending to relieve the pressures of the depression
was recognized by both Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 28, at 2426, 147-51. However, it was not until the publication of The General Theory in 1936 by John M.
Keynes, that the recognition for the need of substantial increases in government aggregate demand
to make up for the lack of private investment diverted to savings became apparent to the Roosevelt
Administration. Id. at 167 ("The only error of the New Deal was its failure to send enough.").
Keynes posited that under his liquidity preference analysis there was the possibility that even under
conditions of monetary equilibrium, full employment would not be achieved, and thus government
spending would be required to assist the economy to achieve full employment. JOHN M. KEYNES,
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 196-99; 247-54 (1936). In his
treatise Keynes highlighted the failure of monetary policy to restore equilibrium between savings and
investment during the financial crisis of 1932 in the United States. Id. at 207-08. See generally
JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 219-32 (1967) [hereinafter GALBRAITH,
INDUSTRIAL STATE]; JOHN K. GALBRArrH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 63-83 (1952).
30. In order to reduce the unemployment ranks and to stimulate aggregate demand, the level
of expenditures by the federal government through public assistance projects rose dramatically. See,
e.g., GALBRAITH, INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 29, at 228; STEIN, supra note 28, at 167-68.
From one perspective, portions of the New Deal agenda reflected elements of distributive justice in
the Aristotelian sense in that its policies more evenly divided the stock of wealth in society among
its members. ARISTOTLE, ETHiCA NICOMACHEA, Book V.3 (Ross ed., 1925).
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commercial and investment banking. 3
Furthermore, in this environment
"deposit insurance was advanced and accepted as a method of controlling the
economic consequences of bank failures" 32 and thus, of restoring public
confidence in the banking system.33

31. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188-189
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 377, 378 (1989 & West Supp. 1991). See
generally Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKING L.J. 483 (1971).
32. Golembe, supra note 21, at 200. Bank failure like the failure of any business involves
capital losses to the owners and their depositors and other creditors. However, it has been asserted
that unlike other business failures, bank failure has more significant macroeconomic consequences - the drastic reductions in the supply of money and resultant general economic downturn following
bank runs. See, e.g., TR.EASURY REPORT, Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 14, at 1-611 (listing contraction of money supply, disruption in payment system, interference with financial
intermediation among other macroeconomic consequences); Fischel et al., supra note 16, at 311-12
(listing decreases in money supply resulting in unemployment and output problems as well as
interruptions in the supply of credit for investment projects as potential macroeconomic results of
bank failure); Golembe, supra note 21, at 181-82 (asserting that the primary purpose of deposit
insurance is not to protect the small depositor, but to end the collapse of the circulating medium);
Scott & Mayer, supra note 15, at 858-59 (listing the dangerous reductions in the money supply and
its potential effect on economic activity). There is no doubt that the asymmetry between the
maturity structures of bank assets and liabilities makes them "different" from other businesses,
however, the alleged macroeconomic effects of bank failure are coming under recent attack. See,
e.g., Fischel et al., supra note 16, at 310-11 (arguing that bank failures are not inherently
contagious); Macey, supra note 15, at 1282 (concluding that "there is no reason at all why bank
failures should be contagious"); Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 1156-62 (discounting the
"spillover" effects of one bank failure upon public confidence and loss of society's stock of wealth);
Scott, Deposit Insurance, supra note 4, at 932 (arguing that bank failure is a powerful tool for
promoting efficiency); A. Dale Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129, 147
(1967) (advocating a reassessment of the widely held view that banks cannot be permitted to fail).
Another commentator as part of his argument for the repeal of the laws forcing the separation of
commercial and investment banking asserted that Congress and regulators "misperceive the costs and
benefits of bank failure, and pursue excessively the goal of bank 'safety and soundness'." Halpert,
supra note 16, at 533.
Notwithstanding this current debate on the true macroeconomic costs of bank failure, deposit
insurance was put forward as the device to prevent this perceived economic Armageddon, and thus,
the viability of the insurance fund became the central policy goal. This macroeconomic crisis
syndrome with its resultant incessant demand for the security of the insurance fund has plagued
failed bank policy since the New Deal. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and
Recommendations, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that the administration's goal is to minimize the
.cost of the insurance fund of resolving failed banks."). But see K. A. Randall, The Federal
Deposit InsuranceCorporation:RegulatoryFunctionsandPhilosophy,31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
696, 702 (1966) (asserting boldly that "[the Corporation, moreover, is concerned less with keeping
the insurance fund intact and more with preserving public confidence in banks.").
33. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 8, reprintedin 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3765-66 (noting that
the FDIC brings "to depositors sound, effective, and uninterrupted operation of the banking system
with resulting safety and liquidity in bank deposits."); Scott & Mayer, supra note 15, at 858-59
("'The primary function of the insurance system is not to replace the deposits of failed banks, but
rather to reduce the incidence of failure by assuring the public that deposits are safe and hence
preventing runs that can topple even sound banks.").
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Given this arena, the D'Oench Court's preoccupation with the goal of
preserving the insurance fund may have been justified in economic terms.
However, such a fixation eliminated considerations of what other values and/or
possible private and social costs the decision would engender.' As a result of
D'Oench, a debtor of a failed institution has not only lost his day in court, but
has also become the scapegoat for the inability of failed bank policy to achieve
its ultimate macroeconomic goal of minimizing losses to the insurance fund.
The D'Oench debtor has been forced to bear more than his fair share of
responsibility for the recent economic downturn and resulting loan losses as well
as those caused by the nonfeasance and/or malfeasance of the institutions and
their regulators. 5 Such a result flies in the face of ethical considerations of
commutative justice' which would militate in favor of applying principles of
fairness on a basis.
Furthermore, D'Oench creates an incalculable externality by leaving the
hapless debtor with the possibility of seeking relief under the bankruptcy laws

34. See, e.g., Hymanson, Note, supra note 7, at 319 (arguing that the expansion of the doctrine
causes "unwarranted disruption of established commercial practices. . . and results in a grave
injustice to innocent, good faith borrowers who have been defrauded by their bankers"). The
present preoccupation of failed bank policy to preserve the insurance fund led one commentator to
acknowledge that the present regulatory climate "may frustrate attempts to use the bank failure
process to achieve other goals." Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1175. Garten expressed
no regrets, however, as she is wedded to the failed bank paradigm where the cost of failure
resolution is the primary consideration, "despite the consequences of that policy for bank investors,
managers, and the banking system." Id. at 1195.
35. Poor supervision and performance by regulators was identified as one of the causes
contributing to the savings and loan fiasco. FIRREA REPORT, supra note 8, at 301-02, reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 97-98. Even the Treasury Department acknowledged that the overlapping
scheme of banking regulations and the regulators' supervisory performance accentuated the present
banking crisis. TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 46, 63.
The causes of bank failure are many. See Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 1154 (listing fraud
and self-dealing, insufficient asset diversification, and fluctuation in the business cycle); Garten,
Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1167 (listing management error, economic conditions, government
policies, and lack of public confidence).
36. As used in this article, commutative justice refers to the correction or rectification of
inequalities that arise between individuals as a result of interaction between them and calls for
fundamental fairness in these exchanges. This approach is similar to the Aristotelian concept of
corrective or commutative justice by which Aristotle meant the resolution of disputes according to
criteria of fairness and based on the nature of the relationships between the parties. ARISTOTLE,
supra note 29, at BookV.4. Commutative justice needs to be distinguished from Aristotle's concept
of distributive justice or distributional equity which relates to the fairness of the overall societal
distribution of wealth as opposed to fairness in the resolution of a particular dispute. Id. at Book
V.3-5. For a discussion of the relation between commutative justice and distributive justice in
Aristotle, see J.M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 178-84 (1980).
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because of his inability to repay debt.37 These concerns in and of themselves
should raise eyebrows, perhaps even more so today, in light of the fact that the
ultimate values sought to be achieved through bank regulatory policy appear to
be shifting. The purpose of this article is to consider whether the D'Oench
doctrine has any continued economic or philosophic validity in an era of
"healthy bank" policy.
The first part of this article will investigate the legal basis for D'Oench in
light of the then-existing bank liquidation law. From this examination it will
become apparent that the decision was merely another example of ad hoc
decision making by the Roosevelt Cour9 to reach a desired economic result.
The article will then move to a discussion of the bank failure paradigm which
has been the basis of bank regulatory policy since the New Deal. This
paradigm's underlying objective has been to achieve the macroeconomic goal of
a sound and stable money supply.39 However, to reach this goal, bank failure
policies have been implemented which emphasize bottom line FDIC accounting
costs with little concern or regard for other private or social costs, or for that
matter concepts of fairness. The justification for these policies was and is
purely economic -- that is, to the extent that bank failures can be handled at the
least cost, the policies are justified. D'Oench is supposedly justified under this
paradigm.'
Then this article will turn its focus to presenting an alternative paradigm,
which shares with the failed bank paradigm, the underlying goals of preserving
public confidence and a stable money supply. However, the policies proposed

37. In 1990, 718,107 families filed for personal bankruptcy; in 1991 the figure is expected to
be around 900,000. Michael Allen, PersonalBankruptcy Claims New Victims: WealthierAmercans,
WALL ST. J., (Southwest ed.) June 26, 1991, at 1. A growing number of these cases were highly
paid professionals reeling from high personal debt and falling real estate values. Id.
38. By 1942 Roosevelt was successful in "packing" the Court. Seven of the nine justices were
hand-picked by the Roosevelt Administration, while an eighth, although appointed by Coolidge, was
elevated to the position of Chief Justice by Roosevelt. Justice Douglas, the D 'Oench author was a
legal positivist who firmly believed that judge-made law was necessary as an adaptation to the
circumstances. See Beryl H. Levy, Realistic Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1960). Cf. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 465 ("for on the whole
the law has been shaped by practical needs").
39. See KANE, supra note 15, at 32-33 (identifying the goals of deposit insurance as
redistributive [as part of the larger New Deal economic programs], economic efficiency, and the
macroeconomic goal of avoiding destructive swings in public confidence). See also Scott & Mayer,
supra note 15, at 858 (noting that "[o]n a macroeconomic level deposit insurance acts as a stabilizer
by preventing dangerous reductions in the stock of money through bank failures.").
40. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d. 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944
(1985) (asserting state law defenses would "prevent" the FDIC from performing its statutory
mandate). See also Weiss & Kraus, supra note 24, at 283-84 (concluding that unless successor
institutions are protected by D 'Oench the FDIC will be unable to effectively perform its role).
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to achieve these goals are ones that will promote an environment of less risk
In that regard the focus will be
taking and better managed banks.
microeconomic in that the emphasis will be on creating an atmosphere for asset
protection in individual banks. The inherent values sought to be promoted by
this emphasis is accountability on the part of banks and their regulators in
handling and evaluating credit risks. In the event of failure4' such policies will
divorce the treatment of asset liquidation (failure resolution techniques) from that
of deposit liability protection. The asset liquidation policies will be ethically
value-based and thus, will deal with debtors not as pawns in the larger
macroeconomic scheme, but as specific individuals with equitable rights.'
The values of commutative justice which are remarkably overlooked under
the economic "least cost approach" of the present failure resolution system,43

41. Although the goal of the healthy bank paradigm presented in this article is to implement
policies that create a stable money supply and promote public confidence in the banking system
through better managed and supervised institutions, there is the inevitable recognition that banks will
fail for a variety of reasons. In such an event, the policies create a separation between the treatment
of the assets and liabilities of the failed bank. On the liability side of the failed bank's balance sheet,
the policies provide some level of deposit insurance to protect depositors and to prevent bank runs.
On the asset side, the policies promote a fair and equitable resolution of disputes between the failed
bank debtors and the FDIC. See infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
42. The recognition of competing and sometimes conflicting values of failure resolution policy
is known to the Treasury Department. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at [1-28 (noting that
failure resolution policy should maintain public confidence, encourage market discipline, be cost
effective, and be as equitable and consistent as possible). The problems underlying the application
of the D 'Oench doctrine are that perception rather than individual factual reality often leads to giving
overwhelming weight to one value to the detriment of the others. See, e.g., Bell & Murphy &
Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 244
(1990) (stating that the D'Oench doctrine "favors the interest of depositors and creditors of a failed
bank, who cannot protect themselves from secret agreements, over the interest of borrowers, who
can").
43. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1989) (providing that the cost of an alternative failure
resolution technique can not be more than the amount that the FDIC would have to pay out if it
liquidated the bank, except when the FDIC determines that the "continued operation of such insured
depository institution is essential to provide adequate depository services in its community"). This
cost test became part of the statutory law as a result of the Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act which
was included in the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-320,
Title I, § 111, 96 Stat. 1469, 1469-71 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1989)). Even
prior to this amendment the FDIC had, as a result of its internal policies since 1951, pursued the
cheapest alternative between the deposit payoff or purchase and assumption transaction. TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-31. The enactment of the least cost test clearly established that
Congress valued the preservation of the corpus of the FDIC fund above other values. See Macey
& Miller, supra note 15, at 1179. One commentator noted a rather obvious fact that the method of
calculating the costs of alternative methods of failure resolution in a particular case is "left to the
discretion of the agency involved." KANE, supra note 15, at 46. Another boldly asserted that the
methods used by the FDIC in calculating costs in open bank assistance are "flawed". Macey &
Miller, supra note 15, at 1177 (noting that the FDIC fails to consider the costs of possible eventual
failure after the assistance, in calculating the costs of open bank aisistance compared to the costs of
liquidation). Even the Treasury Department recognized the degree of latitude that the FDIC has in
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will play a significant role in evaluating debtors' rights. This approach
recognizes that healthy bank regulatory policy is a response to the problem of
credit risk inherent in the banking industry, and as such will approach bank
failure not only as an economic issue, but as part of a larger social and ethical
problem that affects all members of society. This value-based approach to
failure resolution differs dramatically from the macroeconomic view of the
present failed bank paradigm which only attempts to reduce the costs to the
insurance system. In contrast, the value-based account is founded on a deeper
understanding of what the concern of banking regulatory policies should address:
accountability, credibility, and fairness.
Finally, the article will analyze whether D'Oench has any role to play in
a value-based approach to bank failure under a healthy bank paradigm. By
emphasizing less risk taking and better asset management by banks before
failure, the economic justification for D'Oench will probably disappear.
D'Oench has been used to increase the assets of a closed bank or to reduce the
dollar amount of creditors' claims" under the guise of protecting the insurance

choosing among the various alternatives. Its recent report stated:
The FDIC's statutory cost test requires that in the absence of a finding that the
bank is "essential" to its community, the FDIC may make uninsured depositors whole
if doing so is less expensive than a payoff and liquidation of the bank. The FDIC may
choose between a P&A [purchase and assumption transaction] in which all depositors
are made whole and an insured deposit transfer, if both transactions are estimated to be
cheaper than a payoff and liquidation. Then the FDIC need not choose the cheaper
transaction under the cost test.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-40 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even the courts
recognized that this authority is to be exercised in the FDIC's sole discretion. See, e.g., FDIC v.
Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1469 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) ("FDIC is given sole discretion to
determine what method it will use to structure failed bank assistance transactions.").
44. In many D'Oench situations, not only is the debtor asserting defenses by way of confession
and avoidance, but he is also seeking to recover damages (thus, becoming a creditor) in addition to
or as a set-off to the debt the FDIC is seeking to recover. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d
1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 954 (1991) In Kipatrick the borrowers sought
rescission of notes due to fraud and damages under both the federal and state securities laws,
common law fraud, and breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1525. The Fifth
Circuit held that D'Oench not only barred the borrower's defenses to the FDIC collection on the
notes, but was also a defense to the borrower's claims for damages. Id. at 1529. However, to the
extent that a debtor has claims against the insolvent institution independent of the note, such as
tortious interference with contract, breach of security agreements, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress he can liquidate those for possible distribution.
See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(1 1)(A)(ii) (1989). See also Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir.
1990).
In any event under FIRREA the FDIC's liability to unsecured D'Oench type creditors is the
liquidation value of their claim and such supplemental payments out of the insurance fund as the
FDIC deems appropriate. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(1)(2),(3) (1989). Furthermore, in non-litigation
situations FIRREA prohibits judicial review of decisions by the FDIC as receiver to disallow claims
not proved to its satisfaction. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(E) (1989). As a practical matter, D'Oench
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fund, and thus promoting the continued stability of the money supply. The
overall effect of D'Oench has been to shift the burden of financial
mismanagement, economic reversals, fraud by bankers, or just poor supervision
to the debtors'S instead of spreading the loss over the entire insurance

type claims can never be established under FIRREA, as a debtor can not meet the requirements of
Section 1823(e).
The FDIC has been criticized in recent years for the manner in which it has discriminated
against general unsecured creditors in attempts to reduce the dwindling deposit insurance fund. See,
e.g., Peter W. Kronberg, Failing Banks: Creditors' Rights and the Distribution of Bank Assets, 7
ANN. RBv. BANKING L. 325, 363 (1988) (concluding that the discriminatory treatment of certain
creditors' claims by the FDIC under the guise of protecting the insurance fund is misguided); Russell
Manning, Note, Creditors' Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a FailedNational Bank, 64
TEX. L. REV. 1429 (1986) (noting that as the financial integrity of the insurance fund has weakened,
the FDIC has taken action directly adverse to a policy of treating creditors fairly). Prior to
FIRREA, Congress asserted that creditors as well as depositors need to be protected in failure
resolution techniques. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 1, 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3054 (stating that the purpose of the Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) was
to "protect depositors and creditors of such institutions"). Furthermore, until FIRREA, the receiver
of a national bank was required to make ratable distributions among unsecured creditors to enforce
the principal of equality. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194 (1989); Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Mixter, 124 U.S.
721, 726 (1888); First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919
(1978) (applying the concept of ratable distributions to purchase and assumption transactions).
FIRREA's limitation of FDIC liability to unsecured creditors to the liquidation value of their
claims and such supplemental payments that it deems appropriate, creates an obvious incentive to
discriminate among creditors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(1)(2), (3) (1989). Although neither sections 91 nor
191 have been repealed (requiring ratable distributions), FIRREA effectively eliminates the
requirement for ratable distributions. 12 U.S.C. 1821(0)(1) (1989) (noting that "[N]otwithstanding
any other provision of Federal law ... this subsection shall govern the rights of creditors (other
than insured depositors)"). See Note, Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks: It's Not a Wonderful
Life, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1052, 1052 (1991) (noting that both before and after FIRREA the FDIC
has pursued a goal of "minimizing total distributions to creditors of failed institutions and eliminating
payments to less deserving creditors"). Since the FDIC still has the obligation to pay insured
deposits in full, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1989), the largest creditors will be the depositors and/or the
FDIC itself to the extent that it has made any payments to depositors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g)(1)
(1989) (providing that the FDIC is "subrogated to all rights of the depositor.. . to the extent of
payment or assumption"). Thus, to the extent that the FDIC can reduce general unsecured creditors'
claims through D'Oench or otherwise, and to the extent that it can eliminate debtors' defenses under
D'Oench, it has more funds to distributed to itself as subrogee. This obvious conflict of interest is
inherent in the dual roles that the FDIC plays under the current statutory scheme. One of the results
of the adoption of the healthy bank paradigm advanced in this article is to minimize the effects of
this conflict.
45. See, e.g., FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1985) (Merritt, I., dissenting)
(arguing that the extension of the status of holder in due course to the FDIC following a purchase
and assumption transaction redistributes "the cost of bank failure from taxpayers, each of who (sic)
bears only a small fraction of the total cost, to a small number of note makers whose individual
liability may be significant."); Goldstein, supra note 24, at 580 (describing the Supreme Court's
decision in Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987), as creating a "policy redistributing the cost of
bank failures from the taxpayers to individuals whose liability may be significant").
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Such a result has long been justified politically and economically to

46. See, e.g., Norcross, supra note 7, at 345 (asserting that D'Oench and its progeny force
debtors to subsidize the insurance fund for the financial "sins" of their former bankers). It needs
to be pointed out, however, that there are major distinctions between true insurance and the federal
guarantee of $100,000 per insured account. True insurance can be viewed as a method of managing
risk by transferring and distributing the potential for loss from particular occurrences among a larger
group. Thus, by paying a relatively small sum of money (the premium) an insured (policyholder)
can purchase a contract that obligates an insurer (insurance company) to pay the insured, if the
insured sustains a loss arising from the risk insured against. The insurer can use the collective
premiums received from all its insureds to pay a loss to one insured, "effectively" spreading the risk
of loss from the insured to all policy holders. Insurers attempt to set the price of insurance in
accordance with the insured's expected loss using the formula of the probability of a loss multiplied
by the magnitude of the loss if it occurs. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW 2-9 (1971). The existence of insurance can give rise to the phenomenon known
as moral hazard; the existence of insurance may increase the probability of loss or its size because
the insured has less incentive to take precautions. Insurance companies can use deductibles and
adjustments of premiums to compensate for this dilemma. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53-59 (2d ed. 1989).
In the case of the federal guarantee we observe two dramatic differences: first there is no
adjustment that an insured institution pays for its premium based upon a risk assessment of its
portfolio (12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1991) (establishing a flat rate assessment for the
BIF at a percentage of "estimated insured deposits")); and second, the moral hazard problem extends
beyond the financial institution to the depositors, who because of deposit insurance have no incentive
to monitor the risks being taken by the institution. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, Conc/isions and
Recommendations, supra note 14, at VII-I (noting that deposit insurance removes any incentive for
an insured depositor to monitor the safety and soundness of a financial institution); Garten, Banking
on the Market, supra note 15, at 131 (noting that many depositors have no incentive to monitor bank
risk); Macey & Garrett, supra note 15, at 237-38 (noting that if there were risk based premiums,
depositors would have incentives to monitor risks). The depositor is technically a third party
beneficiary to the policy and has no downside risk in the event of failure of the bank except deposits
in excess of the insured amount. However, even in this later case the practice has been to fully
"insure" such deposits. See infra note 124.
The concept of moral hazard in the context of deposit insurance is described as follows:
[W]ith the introduction of deposit insurance, insured depositors no longer require
risk premiums commensurate with the level of risk since their investment is safe and,
under a flat-rate premium structure, banks' insurance costs will be the same regardless
of their risk position. As a result, banks may take on additional risk without having to
pay higher interest rates on deposits or higher insurance premiums. The risk-return
trade-off has been altered such that the price of assuming greater risk has been reduced
and, consequently, the bank is likely to move to a riskier position.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at VIIT-2 (notes omitted). In simple terms, the moral hazard in
deposit insurance simply means that a bank can "borrow at or below the risk-free rate by issuing
insured deposits and then investing the proceeds in risky assets with higher expected yields."
Keeley, supra note 16, at 1183. It is the existence of this moral hazard that exacerbates risk taking
by banks. See, e.g., id. (noting that "[i]t has long been recognized that a fixed-rate deposit
insurance system, . . .can pose a moral hazard for excessive risk taking."); Macey and Miller,
supra note 15, at 1162 (asserting that " it[deposit insurance] gives the shareholders and the managers
of insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk taking because the people who stand to
benefit if the risks pay off (bank shareholders) are able to allocate some of their loss the innocent
third parties.").
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avoid negative cash flows for the FDIC.47
However, in a healthy bank paradigm the continued justification for
D'Oench must be that it plays a role in increasing public confidence or
promoting the stability of the money supply. If it does not, then it is not
justified and the doctrine should be jettisoned as excess baggage. The analysis
in this part of the article will establish that the only virtue possessed by D'Oench
is the fact that it has been on the books for nearly fifty years. Thus, although
there is no doubt that the FDIC plays an integral role in achieving the
macroeconomic goal of continued soundness in the banking industry by
preventing bank runs, courts and legislators should not give the FDIC carte
blanche authority to preserve the underlying insurance fund. Instead their focus
should shift to a value-based approach of resolving the problems of failed banks
by considering inherent concepts of fundamental fairness. It is to the beginning
of that task this article now turns.
II. TREATMENT OF DEBTORS IN BANK LIQUIDATION FROM A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

A.

The D'Oench Case

The factual setting of D'Oench is simple and well known to most banking
lawyers. Prior to 1926 the defendant, a dealer in securities in St. Louis,
Missouri, had sold some bonds to a bank. 4 The bonds went into default, and
to prevent their being shown as delinquent assets on the books of the bank, the
bank requested the securities dealer to execute promissory notes payable to the
bank at its office in Missouri. The bank gave the securities dealer a receipt for
the notes, reciting that the notes would not be called for payment. The note
which served as the basis of the suit, was one renewing the original notes and
was dated January 1, 1933, payable at the bank's home office in Belleville,
Illinois. The bank charged off the notes in 1935. Later in 1938, following the

47. This is a direct result of the political ramifications associated with the myopic
macroeconomic paradigm of bank policy where budgetary costs need to be minimized. See KANE,
supra note 15, at 32 (arguing that the "overriding mission (of deposit insurance] is to serve the
president and the Congress as agents and shields"). At least one commentator addressed the
underlying political considerations that face the FDIC and have driven it to bank failure resolution
at the least cost. See Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1174-75 (noting that as the FDIC
encounters operating deficits and needs additional funds it will be competing for funds with other
government programs and its losses may increase the federal deficit). Garten noted that given its
limitation on available funds the FDIC bank failure policy has been geared to using as little of its
reserve funds as possible. Id. at 1174. See also KANE, supra note 15, at 143-44 (noting that
political constraints force the FDIC to compromise actuarial integrity).
48. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 117 F.2d 491,492 (8th Cir. 1941), afd, 315 U.S. 447
(1942) (the recitation of the facts that follows is taken from the opinion of the Eighth Circuit).
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insolvency of the bank, the charged-off note was assigned as collateral to the
FDIC to facilitate the transfer of the deposit liabilities of the bank and their
assumption by another institution!" Subsequently, the FDIC sued the securities
dealer in federal court to collect on the note. The case was tried without a jury.
The judge held that under Illinois law, the FDIC had taken the note as a holder
in due course and ruled in its favor. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the lower court holding that under Illinois law the FDIC had the same rights
as a holder in due course, and thus it had acquired the note free and clear of all
personal defenses."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari presumably for the purposes of
deciding the choice of law issue." Nevertheless, Justice Douglas took this
opportunity to expand the federal common law in the area of bank failure
resolution which had just been conceived two years earlier by Chief Justice
Stone in Deitrick v. Greaney.52 Douglas asserted that the provisions of the
Federal Reserve Act 3 evidenced a federal policy to protect the FDIC and the
public funds which it administered from misrepresentations as to the value of
assets of insured institutions.
Justice Douglas dismissed as irrelevant,
arguments concerning the innocence of the securities dealer, the knowledge by

49. Until 1935, the FDIC was only authorized to use deposit payoffs in failed bank situations.
See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 173 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(0 (1989)). It was not until the passage of the Banking Act of 1935 that the
powers of the FDIC in resolving bank failures expanded. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74305, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 699 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1989))
(authorizing the FDIC to "make loans on the security or. . . purchase and liquidate or sell any part
of the assets of an insured bank"). Under this authority the FDIC was able for the first time to
make purchase and assumption transactions. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 14,
at 112 (table 125) (showing that the first purchase and assumption transaction occurred in 1935).
50. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 455 (1942). The court pointed out that the
Illinois statute that permitted a transferee to maintain the status of a holder in due course even
though the accommodation paper was transferred to it after maturity was a minority view. See also
JOSEPH D. BRANNAN, THE NEGOTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED 290 n.21 (4th ed. 1926)
(noting that section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as enacted in Illinois represented the
minority position).
51. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 455. The securities firm's petition argued that a federal court sitting
in Missouri was required under the authority of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941), to apply the Missouri choice of laws rule. Under that choice of laws rule, the law of
Illinois would have been applied to resolve the issue of the enforceability of the side agreement.
However, the petitioner noted that as Illinois law had not been plead by the FDIC, Missouri law,
not Illinois law, should have been applied by the district court. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 455.
52. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
53. Justice Douglas was referring to 12 U.S.C. §§ 264(s), (y) [Section 264(s) is now codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1007 (West Supp. 1991); while 264(y) has been repealed). Those
provisions provided for periodic examinations by the FDIC of insured banks and criminal penalties
for willfully overvaluing assets of a bank or making false statements to the FDIC to induce it to
provide deposit insurance.
54. D'Oench. Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 455, 457 (1942).
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the FDIC of the dishonor of the note,. and the lack of injury to the FDIC as a
result of the scheme.55 He held that the public policy inherent in the federal
statutes, created an estoppel which prevented the securities dealer from asserting
agreement not to call the notes, was an enforceable side
that the executed
6
agreement.5
Justice Frankfurter joined by Chief Justice Stone, the architect of federal
common law in the area of banking, denounced this needless expansion of
federal common law.57 Justice Frankfurter argued that the extension was
unwarranted because the FDIC would have been successful under either the
Illinois concept of holder in due course, or the Missouri theory of estoppel.s'
But more importantly, he argued that a federal estoppel could not apply in this
case because the alleged scheme was completed before the creation of federal
deposit insurance and the FDIC.59 Finally, he asserted that even if the policies
behind deposit insurance could be applied retroactively, there was no evidence
that the note in question had any relationship to the bank's subsequent insolvency
or more importantly, to the FDIC's decision to insure the bank.' In effect,
the legal basis for the estoppel propounded by Justice Douglas was nonexistent. 6 ' In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Jackson hailed the
expansion of federal common law in this area. He noted that the FDIC could
accomplish its purpose to "bolster the entire banking and credit structure" only

55. Id. at 459 ("it is the 'evil tendency' of the acts to contravene the policy governing banking
transactions which lies at the root of the rule."). Justice Douglas created an estoppel emanating
from federal statutes and asserted that the FDIC was a creditor whom the acts were designed to
protect. The FDIC was a creditor upon expended funds and in order to assist in the failed bank
resolution through the purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC became statutorily subrogated
to the extent of such payments. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat.
684, 695 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1821(g) (1989)).
56. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 461.
57. Id. at 465.
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id. at 464.
60. Id.
61. In the strict and technical sense an equitable estoppel arises only when a misrepresentation
of an existing fact prejudices another who justifiably relies upon the misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs § 139 (3d ed. 1957). Deitrick
created a federal common law estoppel that derived its source from a plain violation of an explicit
statutory provision. As a result of the statutory violation, Justice Stone held that there did not have
to be an injury to creditors, or a reliance by the receiver on the misrepresentation. Deitrick v.
Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1940). According to Justice Frankfurter as there was no statutory
violation in D'Oench, the federal common law created in Deitnck was not applicable. D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 464.
62. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 455, 472 (1942) ("The law which we apply
to this case consists of principles of established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because they
are appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing Act.").

1992]

FAILED BANK POLICY

487

if it "may rely on the integrity of banking statements and banking assets."'
Notwithstanding the unanimous decision of the Court, D 'Oench marked a
major change in the treatment of debtors of failed banks." However, the
decision caused little noticeable concern in banking,' legislative,' or legal
In retrospect, this lack of apparent interest probably reflected the
circles.'
belief that the existence of deposit insurance had been the prescription that had
cured the bank runs that dominated the early 1930's and returned public
confidence in, and stability to the money supply.' Thus, the continued

63. Id. Justice Jackson had no problem in borrowing the estoppel argument from Deitrick. Id.
at 475 ("I think we now may borrow a doctrine of estoppel from the same source from which the
Court borrowed it in that case, and to reach the same result.").
64. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
65. The decision was not mentioned in The Wall Street Journal, 7he New York 7tmes, The
Washington Post, or the Journal of the American Bankers Association.
66. The purported codification of the doctrine did not occur until 1950. See supra note 7.
67. The decision was noted in only three law reviews, and its noteworthiness involved the
limited question of whether federal or state law should have been applied to the viability of defenses
for an accommodation maker. See Recent Cases, 26 MINN. L. REv. 895, 899-901 (1942); Note,
Application of FederalCommon Law, 16 TEMP. L.Q. 336-40 (1942); Recent Decisions, Note, 28
VA. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1942).
68. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J.SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATEs, 1867-1960, at 434 (1963) (asserting that federal deposit insurance was "the structural
change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank note issues were taxed out of existence
immediately after the Civil War"). Friedman and Schwartz stated that deposit insurance sought to
prevent runs by creating public confidence in "the ability to convert deposits into currency." Id.
at 441. They noted, however, that the reduction in bank failures following the creation of the FDIC
was not the result of better bank management or even better supervision by the FDIC, but from the
"FDIC assuming responsibility for losses in connection with depreciated assets" in failed banks and
the knowledge that bank failure would not result in losses to depositors nor runs on healthy banks.
Id. at 440 ("Deposit insurance is thus a form of insurance that tends to reduce the contingency
insured against."). This "public interest" justification for deposit insurance appears to be a
continuing theme. A former Chairman of the FDIC stated that the purpose of the FDIC is "to
reinforce public confidence in the banking system and to safeguard bank deposits through deposit
insurance." Randall, supra note 32, at 698. He continued by noting that the primary difference
between the insurance function of the FDIC as compared to a private insurer was that the FDIC's
"[p]aramount concern [was] with the broad public interest." Id. at 702. Furthermore, a review of
the history of deposit insurance in the United States reflects this public interest theme - to preserve
the circulating medium (money supply) of the nation. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (upholding the constitutionality of Oklahoma's compulsory deposit insurance
program and saying that deposit insurance "is to make the currency of checks secure, and by the
same stroke to make safe the almost compulsory resort of depositors to banks as the only available
means of keeping money on hand."); Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121, 127 (1911)
(sustaining the validity of a Kansas voluntary deposit insurance program noting that one of the main
justifications of deposit insurance was to secure the currency of checks). By preserving the sanctity
of deposits in banks, the money supply is protected. See Tussing, supra note 32, at 144 (stating that
the "major portion of their [banks'] liabilities [demand deposits] comprises the major portion of the
nation's money supply.") See also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, 1-1 ("Federal deposit
insurance has been highly effective in achieving its fundamental goal, that of eliminating almost all
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economic health of the insurance fund was viewed as a necessary and sufficient
condition to prevent further financial reversals in the banking industry.' In a
nutshell, D 'Oench was an integral piece of the failed bank policy puzzle. The
decision enhanced the underlying economic value of the policy by preserving the
insurance fund and thus, allegedly supporting the goal of monetary stability.1

panic deposit withdrawals."). This "public interest" theory has recently been challenged by
advocates of market discipline and increased competition among banks. See, e.g., Macey, supra
note 15, at 1282-83 (asserting that insured banks are the primary beneficiaries of deposit insurance);
Scott, Deposit Insurance, supra note 4, at 32 (mentioning that the public interest approach deserves
closer scrutiny both as to its "historical accuracy and its logical validity").
69. See Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1174 (espousing the view that the single aim
of bank failure policy is "to minimize the effect of bank failure on the insurance fund."). See
generally Golembe, supra note 21, at 193-94. In response to the bank crisis of the 1930's, Congress
passed the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, which created the
FDIC and began a program of temporary federal deposit insurance for banks. Banking Act of 1933,
Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168, 179 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811,
1821(a)(5)(A) (1988)). This Act also provided that the FDIC would insure deposits at member
banks. Id. at § 8, 48 Stat. at 172. But it was not until 1935 that the Permanent Insurance Fund was
created. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, Title I, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 694
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(5)(A) (1989)).
70. Ironically, President Roosevelt never advocated deposit insurance. In fact it was "the only
important piece of legislation during the New Deal's famous 'one hundred days' which was neither
requested nor supported by the new administration." Golembe, supra note 21, at 181-82. See also
SUSAN E. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 219 (1973) ("[r]umor said that Roosevelt

would kill the . . .bill if it contained deposit guarantee provisions."); Howard H. Preston, The
BankingAct of 1933, 23 AM. ECON. REv. 585, 597 (1933) (noting President Roosevelt's opposition
to the idea of federal deposit insurance).
insurance fund became the chief policy weapon to protect the
In any event the FDIC and its
nation from the macroeconomic crisis of bank failure. The FDIC was placed in charge of the
insurance fund and became responsible for the orderly liquidation and or reorganization of insolvent
banks. Bank failure policy has lived and died on the vitality of this agency and its fund and other
policy decisions have been made to protect the fund from illiquidity. See, e.g., Scott, Deposit
Insurance,supra note 4, at 39 (noting that the choice of a failure resolution technique seeks to avoid
a drain on the liquid assets of the FDIC). The original funds were provided by the Treasury and
from the Federal Reserve Banks. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, § 8, 48
Stat.
162, 168-69; Banking Act of 1935, PUB. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 686.
funding). These sums were repaid by
See also Preston, supra, at 591-92 (discussing the initial
1948, making the FDIC self-sufficient and dependent upon the assessments charged member banks
liquidation
for the insurance. See Randall, supra note 32, at700. The FDIC isunique inthat its
and reorganizational efforts on behalf of failed banks isto be self-supporting from the premiums paid
Congress
by banks for the guarantee. This policy decision has had long-reaching tentacles. In fact
and credit" of the federal government behind the FDIC's guarantee. See H.
faith
placed the "full
Con. Res. 290, 96 Stat. 2639 (1982). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that
banks shall display a sign stating that the "insured deposits are backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States Government"). In fact itwas not until 1950 that the FDIC was given authority
to borrow funds from the Treasury in the event of need to supplement its own resources. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 14, 64 Stat. 873, 890 (1950)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1824(a) (West Supp. 1991)). Congress has recently
increased the authorization of the FDIC to borrow from the Treasury as "required for insurance
purposes." See 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (West Supp. 1991) (increasing the borrowing limit to $5
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If there had been less concern with the self-sufficiency and liquidity of the
insurance fund, perhaps more concern could have been shown to principles of
fairness and equity without sacrificing the goal of monetary stability.7'
B. Pre-D'Oench Bank LiquidationLaw
The procedures for the liquidation of affairs of an insolvent bank provided
in the National Banking Act were considered exclusive.' Under its auspices
debtors of failed banks were permitted to assert a wide variety of defenses to

billion). There are of course other ways to protect the liquidity of the insurance fund. See, e.g.,
Scott, Deposit Insurance, supra note 4, at 39 (suggesting borrowing from the Federal Reserve). In
fact the Federal Reserve system has lent support to the FDIC in an open bank assistance plan. See,
e.g., ComprehensiveFinancialAssistance ProgramSetfor ContinentalIllinoisNationalBank, [ 198384 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 199,972, at 87,842 (Joint News Release of
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, May 17, 1984) (noting the assistance of the Federal Reserve in rescuing
the Continental Illinois bank).
71. Cf. Scott, Deposit Insurance, supranote 4, at 39 (noting that the preoccupationof the FDIC
on the liquidity of the insurance fund hampers efforts to determine the requisite size of the fund).
72. See Cook Co. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445,450-52 (1883) (asserting that the
National Banking Act, as amended, provided everything essential from the formation to the
dissolution of banks). In Cook the Court held that the right of the United States to payment from
an insolvent bank was governed by the National Banking Act as amended, and other statutes
providing for a priority to the United States from estates of insolvents or the Bankruptcy Act of 1867
had no application. See also In re Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank, 16 F. Cas. 665, 669 (N.D. In. 1873)
(No. 9051) (holding that Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, subsequent to the
National Banking Act did not intend to repeal the extensive liquidation provisions of the latter).
The first statute creating a system of national banks, commonly referred to as the National
Banking Act, provided a method for the voluntary liquidation of national banks. Act of June 3,
1864, ch. 106, § 42, 13 Stat. 99, 112. This act also provided for the appointment of a receiver by
the Comptroller of Currency for a national bank and a method of liquidation of national banks that
refused to pay their respective circulating notes. Id. § 50, 13 Stat. at 114-15. Although the
National Banking Act provided a remedy to enforce the liability of shareholders in cases where a
receiver was appointed by the Comptroller when a bank failed to pay its circulating medium, the Act
did not provide a similar remedy in cases of voluntary liquidation. Id. In 1876 the Comptroller of
Currency was given the additional power to appoint receivers for national banks in the event of
insolvency. See Act of June 30, 1876, ch. 156, § 1, 19 Stat. 63, 63. This act also completed the
scheme for the liquidation and dissolution of national banks by providing a remedy to enforce
shareholder liability in cases of voluntary liquidation of national banks. Id. § 2, 19 Stat. at 63.
See also Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27, 47-49 (1887) (noting that although the 1876 amendments
specifically provided for shareholder liability in the case of voluntary liquidation, such liability was
implied from the earlier act).
Originally in the case of national banks the receivership function was split. The Comptroller
of Currency executed payment to creditors, while asset liquidation was handled by a receiver
appointed by the Comptroller. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 99, 114-15 (addressing
procedure in cases involving failure to pay circulating notes); Act of June 30, 1876, ch. 156, § 1,
19 Stat. 63, 63 (addressing procedure in cases of involuntary liquidation). However, since 1935 the
FDIC, as receiver, has been in charge of both asset liquidation and payment to creditors for national
banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988).
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thwart collection efforts by receivers. ' In effect, a receiver was deemed to
have merely "stepped into the shoes" of a bank and was subject to the same
claims and pleas which might have been asserted against the bank. 4 However,
in cases of fraud"5 or illegal preference76 a receiver had the power to assert

73. See Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 507 (1892) ("The receiver took the assets of the
[bank] as a mere trustee for creditors, and not for value and without notice, and, in the absence of
a statute to the contrary, subject to all claims and defenses that might have been interposed as against
the insolvent [bank]"); Kiess v. Baldwin, 74 F.2d 470, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (noting that the
defense of failure of consideration is an articulable defense both against a bank, and a receiver of
an insolvent bank suing to recover on a note). See also HIRSCH BRAVER, LIQUIDATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTrrUTIONS § 1069, at 1236 (1936) ( The receiver occupies no better position than the
bank and takes and holds its assets subject to all legal and equitable claims which at the time of his
appointment existed against the insolvent bank.") (note omitted); CARL ZOLLMANN, THE LAW OF
BANKS AND BANKING § 6291, at 362-66 (1936) ('The receiver will also take and hold subject to all
estoppels, pledges, mortgages, payments, legal or equitable claims, set-offs, rights of others, or
other defenses, such as failure of consideration, ultra vires, ratification, the statute of limitations,
the rights of subrogation, and the defense of usury.") (notes omitted). Cf. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1038, at 688 (Legal Classics ed., 1988) ('Assignees
under general assignments, such as assignees in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency, take only such
rights as the assignor or debtor had at the time of the general assignment... ."); Ralph E. Clark,
Set-Off in Cases oflmmaiure Claims in Insolvency and Receivership, 34 HARv. L. REV. 178, 189-90
(1920) (noting that in the case of receivership there is a right of set-off if a court can find an express
or implied contract providing for set-off).
74. See, e.g., Fourth St. Nat'l Bank v. Yardley, 165 U.S. 634, 653 (1897) ('The receiver took
no greater rights in the property of the insolvent bank which came into his possession than that
which the insolvent bank possessed."); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. at 512 (holding that the
equitable right of set-off survives insolvency and is a defense to a suit by a receiver of a national
bank seeking to recover on a note); Burrowes v. Nimocks, 35 F.2d 152, 159 (4th Cir. 1929) (noting
that the statute did not give the receiver the status of a purchaser for value or give him a lien on the
property of the bank).
75. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 261 (1934) ('It is the duty of the
receiver of an insolvent corporation to take steps to set aside transactions which fraudulently or
illegally reduce the assets available for the general creditors, even though the corporation itself was
not in a position to do so.").
76. Since the enactment of the National Banking Act, transfers in contemplation of insolvency
or after an act of insolvency, or those having the effect of giving a preference of one creditor to
another have been declared illegal. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 52, 13 Stat. 99, 115 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. 91 (1989)). See, e.g., Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406, 41213 (1938); Earle v. Carson, 188 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1903); Merrill v. Nat'l Bank, 173 U.S. 131, 145
(1899). See also Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 489-90 (1877) (asserting that a receiver of an
insolvent bank can set aside preferences which a general creditor can set aside even though the
debtor himself can not). In Casey, the Court by way of dicta noted that in the absence of fraud or
a law to the contrary, a creditor could retain possession of bank property that the bank itself could
not recover because a receiver's rights were no higher than the rights of the bank. Id. at 490. In
a later case Chief Justice Fuller stated:
[Any disposition by a national bank, being insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency,
of its choses in action, securities, or other assets, made to prevent their application to
the payment of circulating notes or to prefer one creditor to another, is forbidden; but
liens, equities, or rights arising by express agreement, or implied from the nature of the
dealings between the parties, or by operation of law, prior to insolvency and not in
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defenses even in those situations where the bank itself could not have raised
them. Thus, for example, a disposition of the assets of an insolvent national
bank or a transfer found to have been in contemplation of insolvency were
forbidden. However, liens, equities, and rights arising from an express or
implied agreement between the parties or ones arising by operation of law, were
upheld as valid.'
In Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co.,' the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier teachings, and held that the claim of a receiver could rise
no higher than that of the failed bank." In StandardSurety, a bank president
had obtained note-guaranty bonds from an agent of an insurance company to
serve as "window dressing", in the event bank examiners sought to see the
collateral for certain loans. The president gave the agent written agreements
expressly evidencing a release from payment of the bonds. Following
insolvency and default on the loans, the receiver sought to recover from the
insurance company on the bonds. Relying on the existing state of bank
liquidation law, the Supreme Court held that as the evidence failed to establish
the illegality of the transaction or injury to creditors, the receiver had no
standing to maintain the action.'

contemplation thereof, are not invalidated.
Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. at 510.
The statutory preference prohibition is directed to the giving of a preference, not the giving of
security when a debt is created. Thus, if the transaction was free from fraud in fact, and was
intended merely to protect a loan made at the same time, the creditor could retain the security until
the debt is paid, even if at the time of the transfer the bank was insolvent or the creditor had reason
to believe that it was. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 41 F. 234, 239-40
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890). However, if the security was given for an antecedent debt, the transaction
would be void as to the receiver. See, e.g., Stapylton v. Stockton, 91 F. 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1899)
(noting that an agreement to give security for an antecedent debt is invalid, but if a creditor acts in
good faith and believes that the bank is solvent he can retain his security to the extent of present
advances). See also FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING § 110

(1912).
77. See, e.g., Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, 299 U.S. 51, 56 (1936) (holding that
a payment made by an insolvent bank to depositor in ordinary course of business is not a
preference); McDonald v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 610, 619 (1899) (holding that checks
mailed prior to insolvency to correspondent bank under the understanding that they are to be credited
to an overdrawn account are not preferences even though they are not received until after
insolvency); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. at 510.
78. 303 U.S. 471 (1938).
79. Id. at 480-81.
80. Id. The Court stated that there were no pleadings nor evidence that creditors of the bank
were misled or suffered any damage as a result of the transaction. Id. at 480. In support of this
position the Court relied on its earlier decision in Rankin v. City Nat'l Bank, 208 U.S. 541, 546
(1908). In Rankin, Justice Holmes asserted that in the absence of illegality or a loss suffered by
creditors there were no other exceptions to the general rule that the receiver steps in the shoes of
the bank. Id. (noting that if the "bank had sued while it was a going concern it could not have
recovered, and the receiver stands no better than the bank"). n StandardSurety the Court refused
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Two years later the Supreme Court in Deitrick v. Greaney8' created the
needed precedent for D'Oench and tacitly overruled Standard Surety. In
Deitrick a bank purchased shares of its own stock in violation of federal law.'
Thereafter an elaborate scheme was devised to disguise the illegal purchase. As
a result, one of the directors of the bank eventually executed an accommodation
note for the value of the stock held by the bank and had the record owner of the
stock changed. 3 It was agreed that the bank would retain its interest in the
shares held in the name of another and that the note was not to be paid. After
the failure of the accommodated bank, its receiver sued to collect the note. In
spite of the earlier precedent,s" Justice Stone writing for the majority of the
Court, held that the accommodation maker was estopped from asserting the
defense of lack of consideration.' The Deitrick Court's argument was based
upon its perception of the underlying goals sought to be achieved by the
implementation of a statute prohibiting a national bank from purchasing its own
stock. The Court posited that the statute was designed for the protection of
creditors,s" and to deny recovery to the receiver by not enforcing the illegal
contract would circumvent the inherent goals of the statute to the detriment of
creditors. In Deitrick as in Standard Surety the accommodation maker was
aware of the purpose for which his indebtedness was to be used,' and in both
it was clear that the bank itself could not have maintained the suit.s However,

to accept the argument that a party to a fraud perpetuated against the bank examiners is estopped
from asserting lack of consideration, release, or illegal contract. Id. at 481 (Black, J., dissenting).
Thus, in the absence of injury to a creditor or a violation of law, the receiver was in the same boat
as the bank would have been in, if it had sought to recover on the note.
81. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
82. Since the enactment of the National Banking Act in 1864, national banks were generally
prohibited from purchasing their own stock. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 35, 13 Stat. 99, 110
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1989)).
83. Deitrick v. Greaney, 23 F. Supp. 758, 759 (D. Mass. 1938), rev'd, 103 F.2d 83 (1st Cir.
1939), rev'd, 309 U.S. 190 (1940). The defendant's note had been substituted for that of another
given for the same purpose. Id.
84. The opinion of the appellate court reviewed the then-existing law and concluded that a
maker could set up the defense of lack of consideration to the receiver's collection action, and that
the court would not enforce a note given as part of an illegal transaction with the bank. Greaney
v. Deitrick, 103 F.2d at 88 ("Appointment of a receiver does not absolve such a note of the taint
of illegality.").
85. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. at 198.
86. Id. at 195 ("The obvious purpose of prohibiting the purchase by a bank of its own stock
is to prevent the impairment of its capital resources and the consequent injury to its creditors in the
event of insolvency.").
87. Id. (discussing the basis for the defendant's knowledge of the fact that the note was given
to conceal the illegal stock purchase); Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 303 U.S. 471,
481-82 (1938) (Black, I., dissenting) (noting that both the president of the bank and the agent of the
insurance company knew the bonds were being used to deceive federal bank examiners).
88. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 204 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Deitrick v.
Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 303 U.S. at 479.
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Justice Stone distinguished Standard Surety by noting that neither the pleadings
nor evidence in that case asserted the illegality of the transaction or injury to
creditors upon which his decision in Deitrick rested.s" It was a mere two years
later that the estoppel principle of Deitrick was erroneously relied upon by
Justice Douglas in D'Oench.
In retrospect, the Deitrick decision breached the dam which has left modem
borrowers in its flood waters. While the interests of true bank creditors (as
opposed to the subrogated role of the FDIC or insured depositors) should be
protected to the same extent as in the liquidation of other firms,' and while

89. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. at 200. In his dissenting opinion Justice Roberts asserted
that "it is apparent that, under the guise of distinguishing the earlier case [Standard Surety], the
court in fact overrules it." Id. at 206.
90. Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code general unsecured creditors receive a pro rata
distribution from the debtor's liquidated estate. 11 U.S.C.A. § 726(a), (b) (West Supp. 1991). The
Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee following the commencementof the proceeding to assemble
the assets from the debtor [11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West Supp. 1991)], or from third parties [11
U.S.C.A. §§ 542, 543 (1979 & West Supp. 1991)], or through the exercise of his avoiding powers,
[11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548 (1979 and West Supp. 1991)]. However, in attempting to collect
assets of the estate for distribution to creditors, the bankruptcy trustee is subject to any and all
defenses which the obligor could have asserted against the debtor, except as provided in the statute.
See, e.g., Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) ("[t]he trustee succeeds only to such
rights as the bankrupt possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and defenses which might
have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the filing of the petition"); In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is true of course that bankruptcy, despite its equity pedigree, is a
procedure for enforcing pre-bankruptcy entitlements under specified terms and conditions rather than
a flight of redistributive fancy or a grant of free-wheeling discretion such as the medieval chancellors
enjoyed"); In re Giorgio, 862 F.2d 933, 936 (1st Cir. 1988) ("a bankruptcy trustee obtains rights
of action belonging to the bankrupt subject to the same defenses or limitations that a defendant might
have asserted against the bankrupt himself"). The Giorgio court noted that the trustee may step
outside the bankrupt's shoes to protect the statutory rights of creditors such as under the preference
provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. However, nonbankruptcy entitlements are to be respected
unless there is a need for a substantive change in rights in order to preserve bankruptcy collective
proceedings. The Supreme Court stated this proposition as follows:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State
serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy').
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364
U.S. 603,609(1961). Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'nv. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 35154 (1985) (holding that "vesting in the trustee control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege
most closely comports with the allocations of the waiver power to management outside of
bankruptcy"); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
a state's classification of a property interest as being secured or unsecured generally is sufficient to
determine the priority of liquidation distributions in a bankruptcy proceeding).
A bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover on a note would be subject to virtually all defenses
which D'Oench has stripped from bank debtors following appointment of the FDIC as receiver. See
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banks should not mislead bank examiners about the nature of their assets, the
achievement of these objectives does not warrant overruling the value of fairness
in dealing with one wholly innocent of endangering these interests. However,
Justice Douglas took the Deitrick decision and built a statute embedded solely
with economic values to achieve these objectives by protecting the insurance
fund to the detriment of potentially innocent debtors.

It should be apparent from this discussion that public policy reasons
justifying the D'Oench decision predominated over any legal precedent or body
of logical reasoning. The decision achieved a politically motivated result of
protecting the economic essence of the deposit insurance system which had been
credited with putting stability back into the money supply. Furthermore, given
the fact that D'Oench involved a securities firm defendant, the Court's decision
supported the underlying economic and political philosophy prevalent at the
time; bankers and securities dealers were the responsible players in the financial
debacle of the 1930's.' The legislative response was explicit governmental

generally 4 COWERS ON BANKRUPTCY 1 541.10[l (15th ed. 1991). But as banks are not permitted
to file bankruptcy, the basic protections derived from that statute are unavailable for a bank debtor
following insolvency. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(2), (b)(3), (d) (1979 & West Supp. 1991). One recent
article seriously questioned the dual system of liquidation and indicated that a preferable system
might integrate the two systems. See Fischel et al., supra note 16, at 318 ("A preferable system
might be to insure small depositors while allowing the bankruptcy, laws to operate for larger
creditors."). Contra Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1196 (asserting boldly without any
discussion of bankruptcy law that current failed bank policies are "far less disruptive, than
alternative bankruptcy or reorganization procedures").
91. While this proposition is an obvious truism, the present system of regulation and
supervision has led to massive irregularities in asset valuation that are more significantly misleading
than the "secret agreements" D'Oench was designed to void. For example, the regulatory
accounting principles (RAP) adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board masked the thrift
industry's level of insolvency by permitting accounting "gimmicks" to defer losses and inflate assets.
See FIRREA REPORT, supra note 8, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 94. Furthermore,
the use by banks of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) which mandate that "assets
and liabilities ordinarily be carried at an (amortized) cost basis" has been the subject of severe
criticism. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at XI-3. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,supra note 14, at 7 (criticizing the use of GAAP to value assets in the bank industry noting
that such use results in an overstatement of asset values resulting in a delay in identifying troubled
banks exposing the bank insurance fund to additional losses); Scott, Deposit Insurance,supra note
4, at 36 (noting that at GAAP insolvency the amount of loss is considerable because the market
value of the assets is substantial below that of book value); Scott, Policy Choices, supra note 4, at
917-19 (advocating early closure rules because the present discretionary action of regulators to close
banks at book value insolvency results in substantial losses).
92. The public outcry following the stock market crash of 1929 and the unwillingness of the
New York Stock Exchange to restrain excessive speculation led President Hoover to request an
investigation of the New York Stock Exchange which eventually uncovered massive speculation in
securities on the part of the banking industry. See KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 104-28. Kennedy
noted that although bankers had made profits during the 1920's with their securities speculation,
"[djisillusionment with speculators and securities merchants" during the depression "carried over
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control;" the legal response in D'Oench was to strip a securities firm debtor
of defenses in order to preserve a banking institution's economic value for the
depositors (in reality the FDIC) following insolvency. The achievement in
D'Oench of an explicit economic result, when taken in isolation, may be
justified. However, when such legal authority is blindly followed, other equally
important values are overridden. Rarely, if ever, can one think of a situation
where permitting an innocent debtor to successfully assert a defense to FDIC
collection of a note, would defeat the very goals behind the deposit insurance
system. It should take such a situation to justify the application of the doctrine
to the innocent. D'Oench had no valid anchor and was in fact, a perversion of
legal history. Over time, however, D'Oench became accepted and has become
a key component of the failed bank paradigm. This article now turns to a
discussion of that issue.
III. THE FAILED BANK PARADIGM

A normative view of banking law must be anchored in a definition of the
problem to which banking law responds. How we define that problem in large
part determines the substance of our theory or approach. In this vein, the
regulatory policies dealing with the results of failed and failing banks should not
be viewed as existing in a vacuum separate and distinct from regulatory policies
seeking to encourage safe banking practices. Together, these regulatory policies
should strive for the same goals -- public confidence and a stable money supply.
However, a positive account of the history of federal banking regulation since

from investment bankers to commercial bankers." Id. at 104. See generaly S. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR
MODERN MONEY CHANGERS (1939). The general distrust of securities dealers and bankers at this
time, the public's perception of their being responsible for the Great Depression, and the subsequent
legislation to restrict their activities are all reminiscent of Cade's rebellion against Henry VI. One
subtle difference was the focal point of blame - in Cade's rebellion it was the lawyers. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2 (Tucker Brooke ed.,
1923) ("The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.").
93. In the area of the securities industry the immediate results were the passage of the Securities
Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 and
West Supp. 1991)) and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-7811 (1981 & West Supp. 1991). The purpose of this legislative
effort was to bring securities dealers and brokers under direct government supervision and control.
For an interesting discussion of the investigations conducted during the New Deal in the area of
securities abuses see Richard Flint, An Analysis and Evaluation of Policies Concerning the Activities
of Specialists Trading on the New York Stock Exchange (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
available at the University of Texas (Austin)). In the area of banking the effect was the separation
of investment and commercial banking and the creation of federal deposit insurance. See supra note
31. See also Fischel et al., supra note 16, at 303 (noting that the "essential features of New Deal
banking regulation were entry control, price control, market allocation through the forced separation
of commercial banking from investment banking and securities activities, and close supervision of
investments and related activities').
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the War Between the States establishes that the major problem addressed has
been defined in terms of how to respond to failed and failing banks -- the failed
bank paradigm.'
The failed bank paradigm had its genesis in the political and economic
differences that existed at the inception of our nation. The initial controversies
over the proper function and scope of banking institutions reflected the
differences in the demands for credit between the merchandising aristocracy,
initially led by Alexander Hamilton, and the agrarian majority headed initially
by Thomas Jefferson." At first a centralized money monopoly philosophy
prevailed providing available credit to the powerful merchandising faction
through the guise of the initialf and second Bank of the United States,'c only
to fall victim to the new Jacksonian majority's intolerance to restraints in credit
and its fear of a centralized money monopoly." The demise of the Second
Bank of United States and the subsequent Supreme Court decision sustaining the
rights of state chartered banks' ushered in a period of free banking under
normally lax state supervision and licensing."re With no central control over
the banking system as a whole, to provide liquidity in times of economic
distress, the structure of our nation's banks before 1860 rested upon a

94. The "failed bank paradigm" refers to the supervisory regulatory model, with emphasis
solely on failed bank policy. The term paradigm is meant to refer to a conceptual framework or
model which embodies two separate components. The first is an economic theory from which can
be derived economic results of any given policy; the second is a set of assumptions in the form of
goals to be achieved by the various policy arrangements. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note
14, at m-45 n.8.
95.

See, e.g., BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION

TO THE CIVIL WAR 118-22, 740-42 (1957) (noting that the merchants desired a federal bank because
as a class they were creditors of the new nation who financed the revolution, while the agrarians had
a general dislike for the central government).
96.

See, e.g.,

RICHARD TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED

STATES 8 (1978) (noting that although the First Bank was not a true central bank, it reflected
Hamilton's ideals; it served both as a private commercial bank and as a public bank, as well as fiscal
agent for the Treasury in his issuance of a uniform national currency).
97. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 304-05 (noting that the Second Bank was able to
secure a uniform currency at the expense of state bank notes). See also TIMBERLAKE, supra note
96, at 27-49 (discussing the Second Bank of the United States as the first true "incipient" central
bank in that it attempted to stabilize the unrestrained state banking system). The validity of the
charter of the second bank was upheld by the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
98. President Andrew Jackson vetoed the recharter bill in 1832. Message by PresidentAndrew
Jackson Vetoing the Bank Recharter, July 10, 1832, reprinted in SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 17,
at 14-19 (stressing Jackson's belief that the bank was an intrusion by the federal government upon
the rights of the states). For a detailed discussion of the first and second banks see HAMMOND,
supra note 95, at 144-450.
99. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
100. See, e.g, Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffing Banking Sstem, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 570
(1966) [hereinafter Hackley, Baffling Banking].
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foundation of undercapitalized small banks which was allegedly subject to
periodic collapse.'"'
It was the beginning of hostilities in1861, that provided the initial impetus
for a consensus realization of the need for some sort of modest federal
supervision and control over the banking system in order to achieve national
goals. At first the need to finance the war to put down the rebellion of the
southern states led to the passage of the National Currency Act of 18 6 3 .'02
The Act created the Comptroller of Currency as head of the Treasury
Department whose initial function was to assist in the issuance and regulation of
a national currency secured by United States bonds0 3 that were sold to finance
the war effort. However, it was the National Bank Act of 1864,104 which first
established a system of federally chartered banks"° as the answer to the
banking industry's immediate need to restore public confidence in currency as
a result of the "multiplicity of state bank notes in circulation at depreciated
values."" 4 This initial effort to eliminate state banks and their depreciated
bank notes was so disappointing,"° that Congress imposed a tax upon state
bank notes to expedite the surrender of state charters and reincorporation under
the national banking system."4 Despite efforts to eliminate state banks, and

101. See, e.g., TIMBERLAKE, supra note 96, at 84-85 (noting that the common belief of a
chaotic banking system on the eve of the War Between the States has "very little authentication").
Timberlake noted that the independent treasury and the state banks worked well and even the
financial panic of 1857 was "relatively harmless" on the economy as a whole. Id.at 85. See also
Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System - Part H, 52 VA. L. REv. 771, 824 (1966)
[hereinafter Hackley, Part I1]('from 1836 until the Civil War, state-chartered banks flourished
without competition from any bank organized under federal law and without regulation by the federal
government"). But see HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 620-21 (discussing the economic problems of
free banking in Indiana prior to the War Between the States).
102. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, repealed by Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §
62, 13 Stat. 99. The Act was designed to make banking a "federal responsibility" as itwas hoped
that state-chartered banks would abandon their state
charters and become national banks. See
HAMMOND, supra note 95, at727-28.
103. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665.
104. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 62, 13 Stat.
99.
105. See Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat. at 100-01. The statute
also provided a
method for state
banks to become national banks. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 44, 13 Stat. at
112.
106. Randall, supra note 32, at 697. See also HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 730-32 (noting
that
the 1864 act addressed a major criticism of the earlier act by prohibiting state-chartered banks
from issuing national currency).
107. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 732 (noting that the Act led to new national banks
and not state chartered banks switching to national bank charters).
108. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484 (imposing a ten percent tax on the
amount of state bank notes paid out by another bank). The Act was subsequently extended and
reenacted. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 98, 146. The constitutionality of this tax
was upheld by the Supreme Court. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869)
("[Wlithout this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country
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bring the industry under sole federal control, competing political forces have
guided the American banking system down the road of a dual banking system
with overlapping state and federal control and regulation."°
Most of the current federal policies dealing with banking regulation,
including those relating to the handling of failed and failing banks, as well as
many of the current problems facing bank regulators, arose from the same
underlying competing political interests" ° that created the dual banking

must be futile.'). The increase in loanable funds from demand deposits and the ability to provide
trust services, which national banks could not provide, provided more than enough business for state
banks after the elimination of state bank notes. See. e.g., Hackley, PanII, supra note 101, at 824.
In fact, by the time of the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 the number of state banks
substantially exceeded the number of national banks. See EUGENE N. WHITE, THE REGULATION
AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM: 1900-1929, at 13 (table 1.1) (1983).
109. One of the most striking features of banking history has been the rivalry between federal
and state regulatory authorities over the control of banks. See generally WHrE, supra note 108,
at 10-62 (discussing the rivalry between state and national banks from the passage of the National
Banking Act of 1864 to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913). The existence of both a state and federal
banking regulatory scheme which differed on chartering requirements, capital requirements, and
portfolio restrictions has created a dual system of banking. This dual nature of banking regulation
is the subject of criticism. See William Niskanen, Commentaryof Scott, 7he Dual Banking System,
in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 46 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (arguing that the dual
system creates unhealthy competition). ContraMiller, supra note 15, at 1-22 (advocating that given
the rise in competitive banking, dual banking continue with more emphasis on state-chartering);
Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1977) (noting that if the growing body of opinion is correct (that federal regulation is
ineffectual and costly] there is a good deal to be said on behalf of the dual banking system).
Although the National Banking Act of 1864 and the subsequent tax on state bank notes were
unable to stop the growing tide of state banks, one of the primary purposes of the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 [Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 9, 38 Stat. 2511 was to reduce the growth of
state banks and to bring them under federal control. WHITE, supra note 108, at 4. The Act
provided that state banks could voluntarily become subject to the supervision of the new federal
banking agency while retaining their state charter. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 9, 38 Stat.
at 259. However the Act did not supersede the intricate structure of dual banking, for the Federal
Reserve System exercised only limited supervisory powers over those state banks who chose to join.
KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 8-9; Hackley, Bafing Banking, supra note 100, at 577 (noting that
even state banks which voluntarily joined, remained subject to state control and supervision). The
bulk of the Federal Reserve System's authority rested on influence and leadership - "the expectation
that it could point out a proper direction for commercial banks through its changes of discount rates
and open-market operations, and that they [banks] in turn, would alter their own policies to conform
to the general good." KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 9.
110. These conflicting political forces also had their effect on the monetary policies of the
United States during the period between the War Between the States until the eve of the creation of
the Federal Reserve System in 1914. See generally FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 90119 (discussing the political and economic implications of the free and unlimited coinage of silver
which was advocated during this period). Friedman and Schwartz asserted that the agrarian
heartland of the country, debtors, and western silver producing states supported the free coinage of
silver in the belief that it would increase the money supply and thereby lower the real burden of their
debts and reduce the number and severity of recurrent money panics. Id. at 115-17.
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system. At the beginning of this century that system was composed of
thousands of undercapitalized single office banks under conflicting regulatory
control"' with no effective reserve liquidity, thus increasing the industry's
vulnerability to financial crisis and panic."' The diverse political interests
created and preserved this industry structure; federal banking legislation was
relegated to respond to financial crises and panics by establishing new regulatory
institutions in an effort to correct the immediate macroeconomic malfunctioning
of the banking industry."3 These same political forces have forced banking
legislation to focus on correcting perceived evils of the system which allegedly

111. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 108, at 12-13 (table 1.1) (showing that at the turn of the
century more than half of the over 8,000 banks in the United States were state banks); KENNEDY,
supra note 70, at 7 (noting that at this same time the banking industry failed to embrace large unified
banking but preferred small unit banks).
112. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & SCHwARTZ, supra note 68, at 156-68 (discussing the big city
clearinghouses' concerted refusal to convert deposits into currency during the Panic of 1907);
KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 8 (arguing that the restrictions of payment during the Panic of 1907
established an awareness of the need for a more elastic currency); WHITE, supra note 108, at 81-83
(discussing the failure of the clearinghouses to act as lenders of last resort during the Panic of 1907).
113. As such, the focus of such legislation was ex post - to resolve the purported
macroeconomic causes for crisis after the damage to the economy had been done with little effort
to change the underlying structure of the industry. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 32, at 698
(asserting that our "present federal bank supervisory structure has.., evolved largely in response
to crisis situations"). The impetus leading to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was
the inability of clearinghouses and corresponding banks to provide a more elastic money supply
during the Panic of 1907. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 108, at 83-99; Hackley, Baffling Banking,
supra note 100, at 573. There is no doubt that the Federal Reserve Act changed the existing
structure of the banking industry, however, its true function was "to coordinate banking reserves in
time of emergency" not to meddle with the structure of banking. See KENNEDY, supra note 70, at
9. The creation of federal deposit insurance was a direct result of the banking crisis of the 1930's
and was designed to remedy the macroeconomic problems generated by bank runs. See FRIEDMAN
& SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 441; Golembe, supra note 21, at 200; Scott, Policy Choices, supra
note 4, at 90; Scott & Mayer, supra note 15, at 858-59. The failure of Congress to focus on the
structural problems of banks and the banking industry at this time should not come as any surprise
to students of banking history. The conflict between the Federalist centrist philosophy and the
Jefferson-Jackson independent state banking philosophy, has been a way of life in the banking
industry since the founding of our nation. See generally HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 740-42;
Golembe, supra, at 182 (noting that the passage of the deposit insurance program was a compromise
between two diverse groups - those who were determined to stop the illiquidity of the supply of
money and those who desired to preserve the existing banking structure). The political power of
the banking industry itself has had a substantial impact on the course of banking regulation. See,
e.g., KANE, supra note 15, at 163-65 (noting that because of political realities regulators and
politicians focus on short-sighted solutions instead of the long term problems plaguing the banking
industry); Macey, supra note 15, at 1290-98 (discussing how failure resolution choices and deposit
insurance pricing are consistent with his conclusion that banking regulators are "captured-' by the
industry). See generally TIMBERLAKE, supra note 96, at 220-22 (noting that a Jeffersonian
philosophical abhorrence of power accounted for the delay in the creation of central banking in the
United States).
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spawned each succeeding macroeconomic crisis." 4 Thus, the primary feature
of banking regulation has been on the elimination of alleged abusive banking
practices," 5 as well as entry control," 6 price control"
and closer
supervision of investment and related activities.""
However, the major
microeconomic issue inherent in the very nature of banking business -individual bank credit risk "' -- was for the most part left to the banks

114. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 32, at 696 ("Almost from the very beginning, federal
supervision of banks was directed toward shielding the public from the damage stemming from
unsafe and unsound banking practices or from a general weakening of the banking system.").
115. One of the popular beliefs for the causes of the bank and business failures of the 1930's
was the excessive competition among banks during the boom years of the 1920's. See, e.g., Fischel
et al., supra note 16, at 302. Under this thesis banks participated in cutthroat interest rate
competition to lure depositors with the end result of raising their own costs of capital and forcing
them into riskier business practices through securities activities. Id. Thus, when increasing liquidity
demands surfaced during the Depression, banks were faced with a conflict of interest between
protecting themselves and their securities activities or protecting their depositors. See Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-34 (1971). Another theory advanced for the banking crisis
was that the prosperity of the 1920's so increased the financial reserves of industrial corporations
that they had no need for the resources of banks to finance expansion. As a result, banks turned to
riskier activities, including financing securities purchases, providing brokers' loans, and speculating
themselves in the stock market. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 13. As the banking crisis
of the 1930's escalated, the bank liquidity problem remained unanswered because the Federal
Reserve System refused to intervene believing the crisis to be a problem of bank management. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 358 (noting that the federal reserve board regarded
the bank failures of 1930's as "regrettable consequences of bad management and bad banking
practices, or as inevitable reactions to prior speculative excesses, or as a consequence but hardly a
cause of the financial and economic collapse in process."). Economists on the other hand do not
place the blame for the Depression on conflicts of interest, bad investments, or bad management,
but upon the inherently unstable nature of the fractional reserve intermediation system. See
generally id. at 691-92 (asserting that blaming the crisis on non-monetary factors is erroneous);
Milton Friedman, The Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons, 10 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11-13
.(1967) (arguing that effective monetary policy could have coped with the banking crisis, but instead
the actions and inactions of the monetary authorities [Federal Reserve] exacerbated the problem).
116. See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1988).
117. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 eliminated the prohibition of paying
interest on demand deposits. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 142, 142 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1989)).
118. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West Supp. 1991) (barring banks from operating full
time stock brokerage services). See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
119. The scheme of federal regulation of the banking industry has for the most part been
successful in eliminating the illiquidity problems arising from the inherent weaknesses of the dual
banking stncture. However, the other major source of illiquidity is inherent in the individual credit
risk assessments made by banks on loans. This is the area that federal supervision and control has
failed to adequately address. However, it is in this very area that the D'Oench debtor finds himself.
He is, in effect, the scapegoat for the errors in judgment made by the banks and those who regulate
them. See generally Tussing, supra note 32, at 132-34 (distinguishing between the two sources of
bank illiquidity). There are, of course, certain statutory attempts to reduce risk taking and their
resulting illiquidity problems. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988) (limiting in most cases a national
bank from lending more than fifteen percent of its unimpaired capital stock and surplus to any one
person); 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b, 1828j)(2) (1988) (governing loans to insiders of national and
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themselves as Congress tackled the recurring macroeconomic crisis. As a
result, the focus of the bank failure paradigm has been to deal with the results
of credit risk ex post as part of the larger macroeconomic problem.
Since the early 1930's federal bank failure policy in the United States has
The
been left mainly in the hands of two separate regulatory agencies."
Comptroller of the Currency has the authority to appoint the FDIC as receiver
The
for a national bank upon being satisfied that the bank is insolvent.'
FDIC has the authority not only to liquidate the institution and pay off
depositors,' " but to give financial assistance to weak banks or to plan mergers

state insured banks); 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1989) (authorizing the appropriate federal agency to
establish "adequate capital"). There is also no doubt that the supervision and examinations by
regulatory authorities and requirements for reports of income and condition, have some influence
on the individual risk taking of banks. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1817(a) (1988) (requiring insured banks
to make quarterly reports of condition and income). See also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
STATEMENTS OF Poucy, Uniform FinancialInstitution Rating System 2-3 (1980) (describing the
composite rating categories [the system referred to by an acronym, CAMEL - capital adequacy,
asset quality, management ability and effectiveness, earnings quantity and quality, and liquidity] to
determine financial soundness). But see TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations,
supra note 14, at 10 (acknowledging that the "fragmented and archaic regulatory system" creates
situations where no single regulator has the information or the authority to deal with individual bank
problems). Notwithstanding this apparent panoply of power and control, the bottom line is that the
federal supervisory regulatory structure has not been able to reduce excessive risk taking and prevent
the rising numbers of bank failures. See supra note 14.
120. The Federal Reserve System also plays a minor role in bank failure resolution. In fact,
the system was created to become the lender of last resort - to provide needed liquidity to the
banking system, thereby preventing banking and financial panics. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913,
ch. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in § 409 of 31 U.S.C., and in various sections
of 12 U.S.C.) (the title of the Act specifies its purpose to include the furnishing of "an elastic
currency"). The ability of the Federal Reserve to rediscount members' commercial paper is a
particularly effective way to provide needed reserves immediately to banks. See, e.g., Hackley,
Baffling Banking, supra note 100, at 574. The fact that insurance fund reserves held by the FDIC
to meet its guarantee obligations are substantially less than all deposits, and the existence of large
amounts of uninsured deposits, make the Federal Reserve's ability to be a lender of last resort an
important part of failed bank policy. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 14, at 114 (table
129) (showing that at the end of 1989 only seventy-six percent of deposits were insured and that the
ratio of deposit insurance in the reserve fund to insured deposits was only seventy percent). The
Federal Reserve's assistance with Continental Illinois National Bank's difficulties is often cited as
a prime example of its role in preventing bank failures and a possible banking panic. See, e.g.,
TREASURY REPORT, Conc/sions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 1-36. See also supra note
70.
121. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11 1990). See also supra note 4.
122. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(0 (Supp. 111990). If this option is selected, the FDIC draws on
the insurance fund to pay the balance of all insured deposits. The fund is funded through an annual
flat rate assessment on members' total estimated insured deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)(i)
(Supp. 111990). The current rate is 19.5 cents per $100. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(I)(A)(i) (Supp.
111990) (providing that the FDIC can set the assessment rate for insured depository institutions at
such times as it deems appropriate); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., News Release (Sept. 27, 1990). See
also supra note 70.
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with healthier ones. " One of the principle differences among the various
federal resolution techniques is the availability of protection for uninsured
depositors or other creditors. " The FDIC's choice of a bank failure
resolution technique is controlled and directed by the statutory least cost
principle. Following this principle helps to minimize the effects of bank failure
on the insurance fund"z without serious inquiry into other policy
considerations." Thus, in selecting a technique the FDIC does not attempt
to determine the primary cause of individual bank failure but operates only to
remedy the results in the most "efficient"' manner from a macroeconomic
perspective.
D'Oench places the debtor of a failed bank in the middle of this bank
failure paradigm. As a necessary consequence of the paradigm, courts have
justified their expansion of the D'Oench doctrine by defining the problem of
bank failure in macroeconomic "least cost" terms with no ethical reflection upon

123. See supra note 17 (discussing various failure resolution techniques).
124. See Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1166. See also TREASURY REPORT,
Conclusionsand Recommendations, supranote 14, at 35 (criticizing the FDIC's practice of choosing
failure resolution techniques that fully protect uninsured depositors). The continued practice of
insulating uninsured depositors, who arguably are better able to monitor excessive risk-taking by
financial institutions, has fueled the financial crisis of the 1980's. See, e.g., id. at 35 (specifically
identifying the practice of the FDIC in covering uninsured depositors as resulting in "too much bank
risk with too many costly failures"). Notwithstanding the fact that under a deposit payoff the FDIC
is not required to pay more than the insured amount, it has uniformly paid deposit accounts in their
entirety by entering into purchase and assumption transactions. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note
14, at 1-39, 40; Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 1183 (noting that purchase and assumption
transactions have a supposed advantage in the eyes of the FDIC in that all depositors receive
protection); Scott, Policy Choices, supra note 4, at 918 (noting that the FDIC's justifications for this
policy are its own limitations of financial and personnel resources and to avoid losses to
correspondent banks). Uninsured depositors have historically received most of their money through
the liquidation process or the failure resolution technique chosen. See TREASURY REPORT,
Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 35 (showing that over ninety-nine percent of
uninsured deposits were protected during the "record period of bank failures occurring since 1985").
125. See supra note 43 (containing a discussion of the least cost requirement).
126. Other policy considerations recognized by the Treasury Department include: maintaining
public confidence in the banking system, encouraging market discipline against risk-taking, cost
effectiveness, and equitable considerations. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at M-27-28.
The report continued by noting that the choice of failure resolution technique was dependent on the
relative priorities given the different policy objectives. Id. at M-28.
127. See, e.g., Garten, Bank Failure,supra note 15, at 1196 (asserting that present bank failure
policies are efficient in that they facilitate the rapid reallocation of banking resources following bank
failure). However, even though these policies are generally driven by the least cost principle, they
may not be efficient in the true economic sense as they fail to consider the social, pecuniary and non
pecuniary costs associated with the failure resolution technique selected. See, e.g., supra notes 19
and 20 (discussing the implications of social costs). Furthermore, in the healthy bank paradigm
suggested in this article, equity in terms of fairness, not least cost efficiency is the ultimate goal
sought be achieved.
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the results of their actions. That is, in order for the FDIC to effectively satisfy
its statutory obligation, courts have deemed it imperative that the FDIC be able
to rely upon the stated asset values of insolvent institutions and structure
resolutions to maximize the net present value of assets collected. If these assets
were subject to formally undocumented conditions or claims that would reduce
the net realizable asset value, the FDIC's ability to make an accurateleast cost
determination would become impossible. One court has stated this proposition
as follows:
If the FDIC's right to collect on returned assets, however, were
subject to fraud claims of which the FDIC lacked knowledge,
estimating its potential loss from a purchase and assumption
transaction would be impossible .... Consequently, the FDIC could
not make the judgment necessary under § 1823(e) and the purchase
and assumption method of handling bank failures would be effectively
foreclosed.
Such a result would run directly counter to the policies behind the
creation of the FDIC.... Adopting a state rule of law which would
permit asserting unknown fraud claims against the FDIC, therefore,
would significantly interfere with the federal policies behind the
FDIC. 12
Courts have also asserted that because these cost determinations must be made
"with great speed, usually overnight, in order to preserve the going concern
value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking services, " 2 it

128. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
It should be noted that this decision was rendered before the 'least cost" test became statutorily
required, but after 1950 when the "least cost" approach was an internal policy of the FDIC. See
supra note 43.
129. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d at 865. See. also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91
(1987) (quoting from Gunter the Court notes that if the assets of the institution are subject to
undisclosed conditions the FDIC can not perform its function with speed); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d
156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 944 (1985) ("the essence of a purchase and assumption
transaction is speed"). See also Gray, supra note 5, at 256-57 (arguing that the immediate transfer
of deposits saves the insurance fund); James W. Brewer & Elaine C. Lee, Comment, Bank Failure
and the FDIC: A Survey of Legal Rights and Relationships of the Client and the Insolvent Bank, 18
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1193, 1228 (1987) (noting that speed in the choice of resolution techniques
assists the D'Oench doctrine in remaining "as beneficial and necessary as it was when it was
established"). But see Fred H. Miller & Scott A. Meacham, 7he FDIC and Other Financial
Institution Insurance Agencies as "Super" Holders in Due Course: A Lesson in Self-Pollinated
Jurisprudence, 40 OILA. L. REv. 621, 633-36 (1987) (noting that since the cost test is not absolute
but based on reasoned judgment the speed of the transaction is not necessarily a relevant inquiry).
Miller and Meacham also posited the conclusion that 'the allowance of the assertion of state law
defenses would make a difference in a purchase and assumption transaction only to the extent that
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is essential that the FDIC not be bound by D'Oench type "hidden" defenses.'"
Upon critical analysis the D 'Oench doctrine is not even justified under the
failed bank paradigm.
The very assumptions underlying the doctrine's
foundation are erroneous' 31 ; and the doctrine has failed to achieve the stated
goal inherent in the policy. The assertion that D'Oench is necessary to the
FDIC so that quick decisions concerning the value of assets of a failing bank can
be made and failure resolution will not destroy public confidence or disrupt the
money supply, is a perversion of the truth. 32 In the first place the cost test
is really only an educated estimate,'33 which because of accounting leniency
is based on inaccurate and incomplete information as to asset values. Secondly,
there is no conceivable way that the FDIC can evaluate "overnight" its (or a
successor financial institution's) future ability to collect on the assets of a failed
bank. 1

Furthermore, since many of the D'Oench type problems arise in situations
where assets are already classified or subject to litigation, defenses and claims
are open and obvious even from a brief review of a bank's files. It is therefore
clear that the realizable value of such assets under a least cost approach is

there are uninsured deposits or to the lesser extent of the amount of bad assets, if bad assets are less
than the amount of uninsured deposits." Id. at 635.
130. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that a hidden
agreement is one that the FDIC will not see during an evaluation of the bank's records); FDIC v.
Wood, 758 F.2d at 161 (noting that the existence of unknown state law defenses hampers the FDIC
because it effects the cost evaluation and forces the FDIC to examine files in that light, preventing
the transactions from coming to fruition in the first place).
131. This in itself should be enough to lead to the doctrine's demise. Cf. Paul A. Samuelson,
Theory and Realism: A Reply, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 736, 736 (1964) ("I regard it as a monstrous
perversion of science to claim that a theory is all the better for its shortcomings [unrealistic
assumptions]').
132. But see Garten, Bank Failure, supra note 15, at 1196 (arguing that an integral part of
failed bank policy is "to facilitate the rapid reallocation of banking resources").
133. See TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 40
("Contrary to widespread perception, current law does not require the FDIC to choose the least
costly resolution method."); supra note 43. The report recommended a change in the law to require
the FDIC to choose the least costly method even though the effect might adversely affect uninsured
depositors. Id. at 41. See also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d at 871 (noting that the statutory
language only requires "a reasoned judgment that the risk of a purchase and assumption transaction
is not greater than a liquidation").
134. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at XI-4 (discussing the obvious problems
associated with market value asset realizations versus book value carrying values). The report noted
that in recent years the failure resolution costs have averaged about fifteen percent of the total assets
of the failed institutions. Id. at 1-43 (admitting, however, that in some individual cases the costs
have been as high as fifty percent). See also U.S. to Lose 40% in S&L Assets, SAN ANTONIO
EXPREss-NEws, July 14, 1991, at A2 (citing a Los Angeles Times investigation alleging that there
is a growing gap between the dollar value of savings and loan assets seized by the government and
the amount the government will get back when these assets are sold).
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subject to reduction at the time the failure resolution technique is chosen.'5
The inability of the FDIC to quickly and accurately determine asset value net of
defenses does not interfere with the "speed" or the ability of the FDIC to
complete a failure resolution technique; u it will only effect the projected or
estimated cost, if there
is a desire on the part of the FDIC to protect the
uninsured depositors.'37 In any event the current FDIC practice
of "wholebank" purchase and assumption transactions, encourages prospective purchasers
to "reduce their bid by an amount reflecting the estimated difference between
book and market values of 'dirty assets ' ' 3s which further emphasizes the fact
that asset values on the books of the failed or failing bank do not reflect
realizable values. In such a situation the successor financial institution can bid
low, and then take some of the "dirty" assets and subsequently sanitize them

135. See, e.g., Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
D'Oench bars claims raised during litigation prior to appointment of FSLIC as receiver and the
protection extends to private purchasers of failed institution's assets); Campbell Leasing, Inc. v.
FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that D'Oench applies to bar claims and
related defenses raised during litigation prior to the appointment of FDIC as receiver); Bell &
Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, l111
S. Ct. 244 (1990) (holding that D'Oench applies to bar claims raised during litigation prior to
appointment of FDIC as receiver and the protection extends to protect bridge bank). However, to
protect the FDIC from itself, its knowledge of relevant defenses has been deemed irrelevant to the
application of the D'Oench doctrine. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987) (knowledge on
the part of the FDIC is irrelevant to application of section 1823(e)); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 459 (1942). Arguable knowledge of personal defenses on the part of the
FDIC bars the application of the federal holder in due course theory. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wood,
758 F.2d 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 944 (1985). However, it now appears that the
FDIC and even its assigns may assert this theory notwithstanding knowledge of personal defenses.
See Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass'n, 903 F.2d at 381.
136. See, e.g., Miller & Meacham, supra note 129, at 634-36; Hymanson, supra note 7, at
281-82. But see FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d at 161 (arguing that permitting defenses creates a
situation where "the transaction [purchase and assumption] will not take place").
137. See Miller & Meacham, supra note 129, at 635-36 (arguing that state law defenses are
only relevant to the extent of the uninsured deposits that the FDIC makes the acquiring bank
assume).
138. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-45. The report stated that prior to 1985, most
purchase and assumption transactions involved the merging bank acquiring only the highest quality
assets such as cash and government securities, leaving the FDIC with the remaining assets. Id. at
1-44. However, in 1985, the FDIC began a program of transferring lower quality assets to acquiring
institutions with the right of the acquiring institution to return assets to the FDIC at book value (or
sometimes at discounts of five to ten percent) within a specified period of time. Id. More recently,
the FDIC instituted the whole bank purchase and assumption transaction where the acquiring
institution purchases all the assets without the right of returning unwanted or uncollectible assets to
the FDIC. Id. at 45. See generally id. at ch. X (table 6) (listing the numbers of the various types
of transaction completed from 1987 through September, 1989). By the use of the term 'dirty asset'
is meant any asset whose collectibility is questionable. A problem of collectibility could arise from
alleged defenses, as well as the credit worthiness of the debtor or value of the underlying collateral.
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through asserting a D'Oench defense. 39 Finally, and most important, the
doctrine does not even have the salutary effect of encouraging individual banks
to control their risk, as they are not the ones who suffer from D'Oench.
Federal deposit insurance was established as a regulatory method to protect
the circulating medium and had the added benefit of protecting the small
depositor."' Although our present system of deposit insurance and related
regulatory programs have been successful in preventing bank runs and in
bringing stability to the money supply, they have done so increasingly at social
costs. Even the protection provided by D'Oench has not been able to stem the
losses sustained by the insurance fund. Those mounting losses are a direct result
of the very credit risks that the present regulatory scheme has fostered. 4' The
D'Oench doctrine was founded on the mistaken assumption of the failed bank
paradigm that the goal of monetary stability could be achieved by preserving the
deposit insurance fund through reduction of costs to the FDIC in a failed bank
context. There is no doubt that the goal of financial stability is and should be
one of the major consideration behind federal banking policies.
Indeed, that goal for the most part has been achieved even though the FDIC
continues to operate at a loss 42 and its insurance funds are virtually
depleted. 43 This success has been accomplished by creating public confidence
in the security of demand deposits, the major liability on a bank's balance sheet,
and by the federal guarantee of those deposits. The existence of a deposit
insurance fund is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for this
macroeconomic monetary stability. It is the ability of the government to back
its guarantee that is the necessary condition for this stability. However, it is
public confidence in that ability that creates the final sufficient condition insuring
macroeconomic stability. Equitable application of failure resolution techniques,

139. See, e.g, Porras v. Petroplex Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d at 381 (holding that an acquiring
institution enjoys the status of federal holder in due course); Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901
F.2d at 1248 (holding that a successor financial institution can assert a D'Oench defense).
140. See supra notes 32-33. One recent commentator noted:
[Dieposit insurance resolved the instability of banking by assuring depositors of the
safety and accessibility of their deposits, thereby obviating the necessity of maintaining
vigilant attention to bank solvency.. By averting depositors' impulse to withdraw funds
in anticipation of withdrawal imbalances, deposit insurance ended the potential for bank
panics and brought stability to fractional reserve banking.
Halpert, supra note 16, at 495.
141. See supra note 46 (discussing the concept of moral hazard). In the final analysis, failed
bank policy as presently practiced has been self-perpetuating. That is, it has fostered the very risk
that has subsequently led to bank failure. It is this increasing rise in failures and the drain on the
insurance fund which has been used to justify its continued existence.
142. FED. DEPosrr INS. CoRP., supra note 14, at 82 (showing that for each of the calendar
years 1988 and 1989 the FDIC sustained a net operating loss).
143. See supra note 14.
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in and of themselves, can be a part of instilling that public confidence, as can
policies that reduce excessive risktaking by banks.
The failed bank paradigm's obsession with macroeconomic considerations
together with its failure to invest in microeconomic policies which would
encourage better management through responsible regulation, has led to the
demise of public confidence in the basic integrity of the banking system. This
lack of public confidence has created a basic institutional instability in the system
that needs to be addressed. Nonetheless, the regulatory focus of failed bank
policy, although having achieved a fair degree of monetary stability, has proved
incapable of creating an atmosphere that either fosters healthy well-managed
banks or encourages public confidence in the banking and regulatory system.
Thus, the time has come to consider the adoption of a value-based healthy bank
paradigm. '

IV. THE HEALTHY BANK PARADIGM
The problem addressed in the healthy bank paradigm is defined in terms of
how to deal with individual bank credit risk. However, the central reference
point is not how to eliminate it, or how to deal with its results ex post, but how
to create a regulatory atmosphere that encourages ex ante accountability and
responsibility for bank risk-taking. The ultimate goals of the healthy bank
paradigm are public confidence and a stable money supply. Public confidence
is achieved not only by creating security for insured deposits, but also by
developing integrity in the banking system itself.
At the heart of the policies to achieve these goals is the recognition that the
existence of deposit insurance" creates a separation between the problems of

144. Cf. Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justficadon For Financial
Rehabilitatonof the ConsumerDebtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515, 531-43 (1991) (discussing
the need for bankruptcy law to reflect the moral values inherent in society). Even conservative law
and economic scholars recognize the fact that legal rights and obligations need to change and adapt
over time to reflect the changes in relative economic values of competing uses of the factors of
production. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC, supra note 19, at 47.
145. Changes in the amount and extent of coverage for deposit insurance are suggested by the
present administration. See TREASURY REPORT, Conclusionsand Recommendations, supra note 14,
at 33-43. Concern over the extent and scope of deposit insurance has been previously expressed.
See, e.g., KANE, supra note 15, at 155-56 (discussing the need to limit coverage in the area of
brokered deposits); Scott, Policy Choices, supra note 4, at 31-32 (questioning the justification of
coverage at the $100,000 level and the practice of permitting multiple accounts). For purposes of
this article it is sufficient that there be some level of deposit insurance, that its terms and conditions
are known, and that there is a government guarantee of all insured deposits.
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deposit-account security and bank failure.'"
The existence of deposit
insurance provides the initial solution to the macroeconomic problem of liquidity
following bank failure by providing depositor confidence in the security of
insured deposits.
However, deposit insurance is not a remedy for the
microeconomic problem of reducing individual bank risk-taking. In fact the
very existence of deposit insurance creates a moral hazard that exacerbates
individual bank risk and the possibility of bank failure. 47
The policies dealing with the microeconomic illiquidity of individual banks
must focus on creating an increased public confidence in the integrity of the
structure of banking and its regulators. Thus, those policies need to create
incentives to reduce the excessive risk-taking by individual banks and to develop
a consistent and equitable solution for the treatment of all parties involved in a
failure situation.
Healthy bank policies strive to reduce failure possibilities by counteracting
the moral hazard problem inherent in deposit insurance, with reduction in the
rewards that deposit insurance provides for excessive risk taking.' 4 Thus,
these policies seek to improve bank management, increase regulatory
supervision, increase uninsured depositor exposure in the event of failure, and
create consistent and equitable treatment of all parties in a failure situation.
Public confidence in the integrity of the system can be maintained only if banks,
depositors, and their regulators become accountable and accept responsibility for
problems of credit risk. By addressing the problem facing banking law in terms
of encouraging management and regulator responsibility prior to failure, and
fairly dealing with creditors and debtors during failure resolution, the focus of
the healthy bank paradigm becomes ethically value-based in contrast to the failed
bank paradigm whose primary consideration is economic.
It needs to be remembered that in the final 'analysis banking policies are
justified, when and if, they are effective in achieving the goals for which those
policies were implemented. The demise of the failed bank paradigm has been
a direct result of its inability to achieve public confidence in the integrity of the
banking industry and its regulators, not the inability of its policies to prevent
bank failures. This result was the inevitable byproduct of the paradigm's
preoccupation with the costs of failure resolution driven by the political realities

146. Economists have long recognized this separation. See Tussing, supra note 32, at 145
("deposit insurance has largely separated the question of deposit-account security from that of bank
failure").
147. See supra note 46 for a discussion of the concept of moral hazard.
148. See Keeley, supra note 16, at 1198 (concluding his empirical economic research by
arguing that the "deposit insurance system must be reformed to reduce the rewards it provides for
excessive risk taking").
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of our country. 49 From the 1930's until recently, the proponents of failed
bank policies led politicians and the public to perceive their success purely in
terms of the sanctity and liquidity of the insurance fund; when the fund went
bankrupt, so too did their credibility. Healthy bank policy seeks to regain that
lost public confidence by stressing individual bank safety and integrity. It
addresses head-on the microeconomic question of individual bank risk ex ante,
and does not dabble in large aggregates that treat individual credit-risk issues as
insignificant and unimportant for national policy. Its concern is creating
solutions to the bank risk problem, not reacting to its results. To generate
public confidence, the public must have faith in the system as evidenced by the
lack of faith and subsequent demise of the failed bank paradigm.
Thus, implicit in the healthy bank paradigm is the awareness that liberal
paternalism has failed to achieve its goal through failed bank policies, and that
the time has come for bank management, depositors, and regulators to be held
accountable and responsible for their actions. In a healthy bank paradigm the
focus of regulatory action will be on reducing risk takingse through risk based
insurance premiums, '51 modified market value accounting,"n early
53
intervention in appointing receivers prior to actual insolvency,' treatment of

149. See generally KANE, supra note 15, at 163-65 (discussing the political dilemma of
reforming the deposit insurance system).
150. I realize that there is no consensus on whether the proposals of a healthy bank regulatory
policy will be more effective in reducing the numbers of bank failures. Compare Garten, Bank
Failure, supra note 15, at 1195 (boldly asserting that bank failure policy will be unable to create the
proper incentives for better managed banks) and Garten, Still Banking, supra note 16, at 242
("empirical studies of depositor behavior not only have failed to demonstrate that depositors will
exert effective market discipline, but cannot explain why market discipline is not already working
to constrain bank risk-taking") with Macey & Garrett, supra note 15, at 237-39 (concluding that
empirical data establishes that market discipline is working now but that risk based premiums and
changes in failure, resolution techniques would work even better).
151. See TREASURY REPORT, Conclusionsand Recommendations, supranote 14, at 43-45. The
recommendation for change advocated by the administration was not new. Even before the crisis
arose there were advocates for change in the structure of insurance rates whose voices apparently
fell on deaf ears. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, supra note 15, at 890-92 (suggestion in 1971 that
premium rates be tied in some manner to risk and capital structure).
152. See TREASURY REPORT, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 14, at 48-49.
Once again this administration request for change had been advocated before the crisis. See, e.g.,
KANE, supra note 15, at 148-51 (recommending in 1985 that book value accounting be replaced with
a market-value accounting system). Cf. George J. Benston, Accounting Nwnbers and Economic
Values, 27 ANTITRUST BuLL. 161, 161-71 (1982) (noting that accounting values [book value] are
concerned with recording data to meet the requirements of regulators while economic values [market
value] measure net cash flows or values that need to be constantly reevaluated to meet changing
circumstances and thus are a better indicator of actual financial condition).
153. See TREASURY REPORT, Conclusionsand Recommendations, supra note 14, at 47-48. See
also Scott, Policy Choices, supra note 4, at 917-21 (discussing early closure of banks as a way to
deal with the risk problem). For a discussion of whether early closure rules violate certain
constitutional principles see Curtis, supra note 17, at 375-84 (1990) (concluding that the early
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uninsured depositors similar to general unsecured creditors,'"' and the
elimination of the whole bank purchase and assumption transactions.' 55 These
policies along with the government's guarantee of deposit insurance, will insure
public confidence not only in the security of their deposits but also in the
integrity of the system and insure the liquidity of the money supply. Unlike the
failed bank policies, the policies of the healthy bank paradigm will seek to
achieve that goal through an awareness that depositors, banks, and regulators all
have responsibilities and are accountable for their actions. Ineffective bank
regulatory policy needs to move from economic paternalism to value-based
responsibility." 5 Implicit in this shift is the recognition that the economic
values inherent in failed bank policy must give way to the ethical values inherent
in a system that demands responsibility and accountability.
In the event of failure, healthy bank policy relies upon the deposit guarantee
to solve the plight of the insured depositor and avoid the potential
macroeconomic effects of failure. It is here that the FDIC performs its statutory
corporate role in protecting the major liability holders of the institution.'57
However, because healthy bank policy separates depositor security from
resolution of bank failure, the actions of FDIC as receiver are independent of
its actions in the corporate role. Thus, while the FDIC as receiver is
performing its liquidation function, or engaging in a failure resolution technique,
its goal is to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the banking system
and its regulators. Under the D 'Oench doctrine, the issue faced in the healthy
bank paradigm is whether public confidence in the integrity of the system would
be encouraged by protecting preliquidation entitlements. The article now turns

intervention policies in savings and loan failure resolutions is not an unconstitutional taking).
154. As a result, uninsured depositors will be limited to the amount that they would have
received in a liquidation, unless the FDIC decides to give them supplemental payments. See supra
note 44.
155. See infra note 179 and accompanying text for a discussion of this proposal.
156. This shift in policies reflects a change in the underlying values sought to be preserved by
the policies. The suggested implementation of a new scheme of regulation in the area of banking
law is not unlike the shift in underlying values that led to a reversal in the orientation of bankruptcy
policy. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 144, at 29-40 (discussing the shift in focus of consumer
bankruptcy legislation from the protection of creditors' rights to advocating the human dignity of the
debtor).
157. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 441 ("Federal deposit insurance
attempts to solve the problem by removing the initial reason for runs - loss of confidence in the
ability to convert deposits [bank liabilities] into currency."). The legislative history of deposit
insurance makes it clear that the function of deposit insurance was liability oriented, separate and
distinct from the recovery of assets in the failure resolution process. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 150,
73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933) [report that accompanied the Banking Act of 1933 which created
federal deposit insurance] (Mhe public is afraid to deposit their money in the banks"). See also
FDIC REPORT, supra note 8, reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3766 (noting that the FDIC had
brought "safety and liquidity of bank deposits").
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to consideration of that issue.
A. A Commutative Justice Evaluation of D 'Oench
D'Oench and its progeny are supposed equitable doctrines reflecting the
balancing of the needs for an orderly system of bank liquidation with the
demands of federal deposit insurance. Prior to D 'Oench and the creation of the
FDIC, bank liquidation had as its basic function the winding up of the financial
affairs of an institution, the collection and liquidation of assets, and the making
of distributions to creditors. Preliquidation state entitlements were generally
upheld and the costs of individual bank failure were born by creditors,
depositors, and shareholders.
The creation of deposit insurance interjected into this system of bank asset
liquidation a macroeconomic federal interest to insure the stability of the money
supply. Although the basic function of bank liquidation remained the same, the
D'Oench Court perceived that this overriding federal interest could be achieved
only through the preservation of the insurance fund. From this initial perception
came the false belief that monetary stability was dependent upon the liquidity of
the insurance fund. Even though the dollar amount of the fund is dependent in
part upon the FDIC's ability to collect debts from obligors of failed banks, there
was no direct indication in the legislative history that deposit insurance was
intended to change the legal rights of debtors in bank asset liquidations.'
Notwithstanding this fact, the D'Oench Court changed the manner and
procedures of bank liquidation by eliminating preliquidation state entitlements.
As a result, debtors under the D 'Oench doctrine were left alone to subsidize the
system of asset liquidation. Recent history has now established that a stable
money supply can be achieved even when the insurance fund is nearing
bankruptcy. Thus, any decision to return to preliquidation state entitlements in
a D'Oench type situation is really dependent on whether such a move will
increase public confidence in the integrity of the banking system. This is part
and parcel of a larger question under a value-based system of whether D'Oench
can be justified from a moral prospective.
There is no doubt that the D'Oench decision had certain economic and
political justifications." 5 However, there has been no serious attempt to

158. From the time of the creation of the FDIC in 1933 until the enactment of FIRREA, the
FDIC while acting as receiver was to act "in conformity with the provisions of law relating to the
liquidation of closed national banks, except as herein otherwise provided." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)
(1980), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1989).
159. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. The proposition that law is politically
motivated or oriented is well recognized and accepted by certain legal philosophers. See, e.g.,
RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985) (stating that his conception of law is
"deeply and thoroughly political"); Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME
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examine the doctrine from a moral perspective. This oversight seems odd given
the fact that by blindly following the doctrine of stare decisis, decisions have
been rendered which do not fit any litmus test of fairness. The failure to
analyze the doctrine in terms of its moral implications is reflective of the general
distrust of value-based decision making in American legal philosophy of the
recent past."W In order to begin to isolate and identify moral values, one must

admit that there are normative underpinnings to the resolution of legal issues.
Today with the increasing realization that law is not an autonomous
discipline,' 6 academicians are acknowledging there is a normative basis of law
in a variety of areas. 62 Thus, the time has come to address D'Oench in
J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85, 103 (1985) (stating that "[i]t
must be emphasized that it is a
political philosophy that I am expounding."). Contra Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949, 951 (1988) (defending formalism as "an
exploration of the sense in which law can, after all, be differentiated from politics").
160. For example, legal positivism contemplates only the form of law, confining itself to an
investigation of law as it is, without regard to its justness or unjustness, thus attempting to free legal
theory completely from all qualifications or value judgments of a political, social, or economic
nature. See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 285 (1940); H.L.A. Hart, Legal
Positiveness, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 418, 419 (1967) (asserting that legal positivism's
concern with law is "morally, politically, and evaluatively neutral").
See also POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 348 (stating that "[als should be clear by now, I am skeptical that
moral philosophy has much to offer law in the way of answers to specific legal questions or even
in the way of general bearings"); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
14 (1986) (noting his dissatisfaction with the approaches of the Critical Legal Studies and Law and
Economics philosophers for positing that public morality is untenable with the legal process).
Contra Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAmE
FOREST L. REV. 539, 539 (1989) ("Legal positivism is unacceptable as a jurisprudential framework
because it provides no inherent limits on the power of the state and no basis for determining what
is just.").
161. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, Everyman's Constitutional Law: A Theory of the Power of
Judicial Review, 72 GEO. L.J. 1665, 1716-23 (1984) [hereinafter Attanasio, Everyman's
Constitution] (concluding that the Supreme Court's power of judicial review is not objectively
determinable but rests on rational and nonrational elements); Richard Posner, The Decline of Law
as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761, 766-77 (1987) (discussing
various reasons to support his proposition that the law is no longer autonomous); Roberto M. Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 568-76 (1983) (containing a critique
of formalism and objectivism in the law). Professor Attanasio suggested that the critique of law by
the Critical Legal Studies movement "has helped to dispel the illusion that law is largely value
neutral." John B. Attanasio, Foreward: The Impoverished States of Law and Morality, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 773, 775 (1989). He also rejected the Critical Legal Studies' notion that legal choice
represents "arbitrary exercises of raw political power" and has asserted such choices are built on
moral choices. Id. at 775-76. See also J. M. Finnis, On "The Critical Legal Studies Movement",
30 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 42 (1985) (arguing that his explicit moral and political normative theory to law
is sounder than that of CLS).
162. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 144, at 17-29 (developing a moral justification as a foundation
for an understanding of consumer bankruptcy); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modem Day Peon: A
Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165, 200 (1990) ("discharge
policy must be based upon non-instrumental (deontological) truths"); Robin P. Malloy, Is Law and
Economics Moral? - Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Crtique of Posner'sEconomic
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normative terms.
Even though it has been argued that there is no moral consensus in
America," there is clearly an awareness and realization of what constitutes
basic fairness.'" That is, although there may not be agreement on substantive
moral issues, or for that matter there may not be a consensus on the underlying

Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 147, 154-60 (1990) (discussing the moral dimension of the study of
law and economics).
163. See, e.g., JAMES PATrERSON & PETER KIM, THE DAY AMERICA TOLD THE TRUTH 235

(1991) ("There is absolutely no moral consensus in this country - as there was in the 1950s and
1960s."); Richard Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1990) ("I
regard moral philosophy as a weak field, a field in disarray, a field in which consensus is impossible
to achieve in our society."). Some commentators have argued that this lack of consensus has
resulted from the separation of religious beliefs from a theory of morality which has led to a secular
morality that has no firm foundation. See, e.g., JOHN LESLIE MACKIE, ETHICS - INVENTING RIGHT
AND WRONG 19 (1977) (noting that moral philosophy only addresses linguistic or conceptual
questions, and that its failure to address questions in ontological terms leads to skepticism); George
P. Fletcher, The Meaning of Morality, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 805, 807 (1989) ("The problem
with conventional morality is that neither custom nor consensus can deliver this extrinsic test for
validating the conventional rules."); J. D. Goldsworthy, God or Macke? The Dilemma of Secular
Moral Philosophy, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 77-78 (1985) (asserting the failure of moral philosophy to
have its foundations in religious beliefs leave it barren); Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979) (arguing that secular moral philosophy contains
no real authority); Onora O'Neill, Justice and the Virtues, 34 AM. J. JURJS. 1, 1-6 (1989) (noting
that the liberal account of morality is limiting and inadequate because it detschesjustice from ethical
values).
164. By the term basic fairness is meant that each individual person gets what they deserve.
As used here the term "deserve" is meant to convey moral responsibility and obligations. See, e.g.,
LLOYD E. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 10 (1987). See also Attanasio, Everyman's
Constitution, supra note 161, at 1699-70 ("Deep within human beings there is a need for moral
certitude, a fundamental longing for affirmance of the rightness of our actions."). Patterson and
Kim noted in their exhaustive survey of the moral fabric of the United States that Americans "want
their kids to have basic values and a sense of right and wrong." PATTERSON & KIM, supra note
163, at 235-36. The concept of fairness is composed of a substantive and a procedural component.
Substantive fairness involves concepts of corrective justice and accountability. United States v.
Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing these elements of substantive
fairness as the basis in evaluating settlements in environmental actions). See also FINNIS, supra note
36, at 261-64 (listing concepts of desert and proportionality in his discussion of one of the elements
of practical reasonableness - fairness). The breadth of a concept of substantive fairness rests
primarily upon the common sense understanding of the community. See, e.g., Catharine Wells, Tort
Law as CorrectiveJustice:A PragmaticJustificationfor JuryAdjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348,
2360 (1990) (discussing how tort adjudication identifies a common sense understanding of fairness).
Even Judge Richard Posner asserted that a rule of law is unjust, if it is so contrary to dominant
public opinion. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 334. Procedural fairness deals with "due
process", i.e., the specific manner or method by which the result is reached. See, e.g., Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due
process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.'") (citations omitted).
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foundations of morality -- religious or secular," there is a basic agreement
that law should work as an institutional arrangement in which public officials
seek to elaborate and protect the values that the nation holds in common."
D'Oench can be viewed as a pragmatic attempt to achieve ends of
distributive justice at the expense of giving commutative justice to an individual
debtor. 7 From this perspective D 'Oench reflects the recognition of the more
active role the government was to play in dealing with social and economic

165. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 36, at 351 (establishing the basis for his moral approach to
natural law on requirements of practical reasonableness without reference to religious beliefs);
Fletcher, supra note 163, at 806-07 (noting that morality can be a code of norms crystallized as a
matter of conventions, intuitive reasoning, or biblical authority); George W. Constable, A Criticism
of "Practical Principles, Moral Truths, and Ultimate Ends" by Gisez, Boyle, and Finnis, 34 AM.
J. JUtIS. 19, 21-22 (1989) (arguing that religious beliefs can form the basis of a moral philosophy).
166. See, e.g., POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 454-70 (arguing for a pragmatic
jurisprudence under which law reflects socially determined goals for shaping behavior to conform
with society's values); Frank H. Easterbrook, 7he Supreme Court 1983 Term- Forward: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) ("Judges' claim to authority rests on a
plausible demonstration that they are faithfully executing decisions made by others."); Fiss, supra
note 160, at 15 (asserting that "[w]e need public morality to have law, true, but even more, we need
law to have a public morality"). Cf.Wells, supra note 164, at 2411 (arguing that a "pragmatic
conception of corrective justice is based upon the idea that tort law enforces community standards
of financial responsibility and just compensation").
167. The present system of failure resolution in conjunction with the D'Oench doctrine
arbitrarily prefers the FDIC and uninsured depositors over possible innocent individuals purely for
economic reasons. Although acknowledging that there are other values that could form the
underlying basis for bank liquidation policies, the courts have uniformly rejected them, coercing the
transfer of income from the debtor to the FDIC and its insurance fund to be redistributed to insured
and uninsured depositors. See, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 94 (1987) ("the equities [that
the borrower would have us invoke] are not the equities the statute [Section 1823(e)] regards as
predominant"). In Langley, the Court held that it would not engraft an equitable exception upon the
statute because such an exception would cause economic harm to the FDIC and the solvency of its
fund. Id. at 94-95. Under a value-based approach one can view this subsidization as an attempt to
secure distributive justice for society as a whole rather than commutative justice for the individual
debtor. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 36, at 180-84 (noting the difference in focus between the
aggregate result [distributive justice] and the individual result [commutative justice]). In other
words, commutative justice stresses the equities of the particular transaction, rather than the
distributional entitlements of the parties, and thus concerns of commutative justice should be
determined independently of any concerns for distributional results. See generally ARISTOTLE, supra
note 30, at Book V .3-5. Aristotle argued that distributions were to be made according to merit,
whereas commutative justice treated good men and bad men as equals and "the law looks only to
the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the
other is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it." Id. at Book V .4.
In a nutshell, from an ethical point of view the D 'Oench doctrine overemphasizes distributive justice
concerns of protecting the insurance fund for the benefit of society as a whole, at the expense of
resolving fairly the individual debtor's fate under principles of commutative justice. Such an
approach is misguided for it presupposes the very fairness which in an ethical analysis should be at
issue, and places a presumption in favor of an economic set of values over the value of fair dealing.
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problems and thus, in the underlying distribution of wealth."~ As a result
governmental commitment to corrective justice took a rear seat as the New
Dealers sought to establish a system of distributive justice through laws and
regulations addressing specific ills. Thus, individual economic rights became
subservient to the economic rights of the majority. However, when the
individual rights trampled are those that society holds dear, and governmental
decisions do not comport to a common sense understanding of community
norms, time for change is necessary." 6 The application of the D'Oench
doctrine to an innocent unsuspecting debtor does not meet the nation's concept
of either substantive or procedural fairness."
Although the doctrine results
in certainty for the FDIC in its role as a receiver, the intuitive judgment of a
jury comprised of a debtor's peers would more likely equate with the nation's
concept of fairness in a given context.' 7 ' Intuitively, it is not fair to relegate
the rights of an innocent debtor to the desert for the wrongdoings of others. It
is time that legal decisions in D'Oench type cases reset the scales of justice to
reflect the true balance between society's explicit normative concerns of
commutative justice and the government's economic and political goals of
distributive justice. "

168. See, e.g., Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay between Morality and Law in
Modem Legal Thought, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 784, 800-01 (1989). Woodward summarized in
Aristotelian terms the differences between modern and pre-twentieth century law as follows:
For generations, our law, like that of most societies, was used almost exclusively as a
means of corrective justice; in the modem era, however, and especially from the 1930's
down through the 1970's, it has been used, in addition, as the means by which society
pursued various forms of distributive justice.
Id at 799.
169. See FINNIS, supra note 36, at 184 (noting that laws adopted by those in authority may be
distributively just, but the lawful and regular administration of the law is a matter of commutative
justice owed to all those who have ascertainable rights, powers, immunities, or duties under it.).
According to Finnis, laws must balance the obligations of both principles of justice to reach an
equitable result. Id. He concluded his discussion of this point by noting that to give undue
preference to one or the other would be wrong. Id. at 127.
170. See supra note 164 for a discussion of procedural and substantive fairness.
171. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 164, at 2360 (noting that courts and juries on a case by case
basis rely upon their respective intuitive judgements of the "common sense understandings of
community norms" to find fairness in tort adjudication). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14, 41 (1979) (noting
that the adjudicative method is a process on a moral plane which reveals or elaborates public values).
172. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 159, at 989 ("Distributive justice implies that a political
authority must define and particularize the scope or criterion of a scheme of distribution."). Weinrib
viewed corrective justice as an immediate bilateral interaction between the parties and thus, devoid
of politics. Id. at 992. Weinrib asserted that Aristotle's conception of corrective justice might be
interpreted as requiring courts to ignore distributional considerations. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Toward
a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 38-39 (1983). See also Ulen Cooter, The
Best Right Laws: Value Foundationsof the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
817, 836-37 (1989) (discussing the fact that under policies seeking to achieve economic efficiency
the values of liberty and equality may not necessary also be attained).
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There is no pragmatic reason to treat a debtor of a failed financial
institution any different from a similarly situated debtor in a liquidating
bankruptcy context. 73 That is not to say that the Bankruptcy Code should be
engrafted into the healthy bank paradigm. But the disparate treatment serves to
emphasize the need for consistency and fairness to achieve public confidence in
the procedures underlying the failure resolution process.
The concerns of deposit insurance relate exclusively, to the issues of
depositor security and prevention of macroeconomic crises. As a result, the
focal point of failure resolution techniques, including the treatment of a D 'Cench
type debtor, is on the impact such policies or actions will have on the public
confidence in the integrity of the system. Thus, unless there is a valid policy
goal that would be compromised, questions concerning liquidation or other
disposition of assets of failed or failing financial institutions should be decided
as if the failure had not occurred. Under such an approach there is no
justification to apply an estoppel in situations where the borrower has not
violated a legal obligation, nor perpetrated a fraud under the laws of the state
in which the action arises."
The healthy bank paradigm liquidation law does not create or eliminate
rights; it seeks to insure that preliquidation state entitlements are vindicated. 75

173. See supra note 90 for a discussion of the treatment of general unsecured creditors in a
liquidating bankruptcy.
174. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 36, at 181 ('[T"he scheme for securing commutative justice
seeks to compensate only those who were injured by the act of one who failed to live up to his duties
(in commutative justice) of care and respect for the well-being of others, and who isthereby required
to make reparations.").
175. This assertion issomewhat analogous to the position taken by Thomas Jackson in the area
of bankruptcy. Jackson stated that bankruptcy law isdesigned to ameliorate the common pool
problem central to collective debt collection. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 21 (1986). He argued that "[biankruptcy law cannot both give new groups rights
and continue effectively to solve a common pool problem." Id. at 26. Fashioning distinctive
bankruptcy rules creating rights not recognized in nonbankruptcy situations, would create incentives
by those advantaged by a new bankruptcy rule to use the process to the possible detriment of others.
Id. Thus, he concluded that if a nonbankruptcy rule was undesirable, it should be overturned in
general, not just in a bankruptcy context. Id. at 26-27. "At bottom, bankruptcy is justified in
overriding nonbankruptcy rights because those rights interfere" with the primary goal of bankruptcy
as a superior debt collection mechanism. Id. at 26.
In the area of deposit insurance the goal is to create an atmosphere that generates public
confidence in the integrity of the system and a stable money supply. Preliquidation entitlements
[i.e., defenses to debt collection] are to be allowed as long as they do not interfere with the
achievement of that goal. As an individual debtor has no control over the risks and conduct of a
bank, and the recognition of his defense has no bearing on the stability of the money supply, there
is no justifiable reason to make him bear the loss. The recognition of state law defenses during the
receivership adds consistency and fairness to the liquidation process thus, enhancing public
confidence in the system. If for any reason the assertion of a particular defense is deemed
undesirable, Congress should override that particular state defense across the board. Another factor
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Under such policies the economic costs of failure resolution may increase, but
that loss will be spread over the entire banking system. On the plus side,
however, such a system is morally justified and will instill public confidence in
the manner and procedure of bank liquidation. 76 Moreover, this approach is
consistent with the accepted practice of allocating losses arising from credit risk
upon the system as a whole.'"
V.

APPLICATION OF A VALUE-BASED APPROACH TO BANK ASSEr
LIQUIDATION

This article posits that D'Oench suffers from many deficiencies. The legal
underpinnings ofD 'Oench are weak; it is ethically inconsistent with the nation's
sense of fair-play; it is an integral part of the failed bank policies which have
proven to be totally ineffective in achieving their stated goal of preserving the
insurance fund from depletion; and, finally, D 'Oench is not a part of the healthy
bank paradigm. It is clearly time for change. Section 1823(e) should be
repealed; D'Oench and its progeny should be overruled. In their place state
laws and regulations and an impartial fact finder will be used to determine the
respective rights among the litigants on a case by case basis.
The inherent economic cost issue associated with bank "closing and transfer

that militates in favor of permitting state law defenses in bank liquidation under the healthy bank
paradigm, is that the validity of defenses will encourage more responsibility and accountability on
the part of regulators. The existence of D'Oench can create incentives for receivership solely to
enhance the assets of an institution which participated in alleged improper conduct which was not
detected early by federal regulators. By permitting state law defenses, federal regulators will have
more incentive to adequately examine bank assets during their routine examinations leading to less
risk-taking and possibly less failure.
176. Thus, under the healthy bank paradigm there is a presumption that federal power should
not be used in the area of failed bank asset liquidation or transfer to trump state law entitlements.
This may result in disparate treatment of the FDIC as it seeks to recover on loans of failed
institutions in various states with differing laws relating to a similar defense or claim. On the other
hand the debtor will receive uniform treatment in his dealings with local banks regardless of their
solvency. This result will reinforce public confidence in the integrity of failed bank procedures.
In any event the lack of uniformity from the perspective of the FDIC is no different from that which
the government or other creditors face under the constitutionally required "uniform" bankruptcy
system [U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.4] which generally permits a debtor to select his own respective
state's exemption law. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1989) (giving the debtor a choice of his own state's
exemptions or the uniform federal exemptions, if his state has not opted-out of the federal scheme).
See also Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (noting that the uniformity
referred to in the Constitution is geographical not personal); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1137
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982) (upholding the validity of the opt-out provision against
challenge that it violates the constitutional command of uniformity).
177. See Miller & Meacham, supra note 129, at 636 (asserting that there is no readily
ascertainable difference between the diminishing value of assets acquired by the FDIC arising from
economic factors or legal defenses).
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or payment of deposit liabilities" needs to be divorced and separated from the
remaining bank liquidation functions. Thus, once a decision is made by the
Comptroller of the Currency that an institution needs to be closed, the FDIC
must first address the preservation and security of insured demand deposits. In
doing so it will make an "estimated least cost" choice among its various failed
bank resolution techniques relying upon the stated values on the books of the
institution in an attempt to maximize the economic return from the
transaction. 7 8
Once the decision is made and the deposit liabilities are safely protected by
another institution or paid off, the FDIC's focus will turn to normal liquidation
activities including collection efforts on the remaining assets or those assets
which are returned by acquiring institutions. 7 In these collection efforts and
in the collection efforts by successor financial institutions any and all state law
defenses and claims will be permitted. This approach will increase the costs of
failure resolution to the extent that valid state law defenses reduce the amount
that the FDIC projected it would collect from the assets of failed institutions,
and by any amount that the FDIC will have to indemnify successor financial

178. Of course under the healthy bank paradigm, with a scheme of market value accounting,
the values on the books will be closer to actual realizable values.
179. Under the general principles of commutative justice inherent in the healthy bank paradigm,
it would not be fair to expect a successor financial institution to bear losses from either credit risks
undertaken by the failed institution or valid state law defenses which would reduce its expected
realizable asset value of purchased assets. Thus, under a healthy bank paradigm the whole bank
purchase and assumption transaction would be replaced so that the acquiring institution would
purchase only selected assets with the right to return others. See supra notes 17 and 138 for a more
detailed discussion of purchase and assumption transactions. However, consistent with the principles
of commutative justice, nothing in the healthy bank paradigm would prevent the FDIC and the
acquiring institution from contractually allocating between themselves any of the risks of loss. But
as a general result, those losses would be born by the FDIC to be spread among the industry and
the nation as a whole. The FDIC would also be prohibited from giving any priority to uninsured
depositors, and they would bear the same risks as general unsecured creditors. Certain other
advocates for reform have suggested a return to the modified payoff. See generally Elizabeth H.
Garret, Comment, The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice to Inject Market
Disciplineinto the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1987) (arguing that use of
the modified payoff injects market discipline into the banking industry). Under a modified payoff
the insured depositors receive full payment from the FDIC, or such deposits are sold to an acquiring
institution which assumes their liability, and partial payments are made to uninsured depositors based
upon the FDIC's estimate of recovery from the proceeds of liquidation. See TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 14, at 1-32. If a higher recovery from the assets than had been estimated is recovered,
additional payments are then made to the uninsured depositors. Id. Following the Continental Bank
failure where all uninsured depositors were protected under an open assistance plan, the FDIC
stopped using the modified payoff because "itwas thought to be unfair to apply a more stringent
routine in the failure of small banks." Id. In the Continentalcase only $3 billion of the $33 billion
in liabilities were insured at the time of the open assistance transaction. Id. at M11-29. In this
author's opinion, the modified payoff is unacceptable because uninsured depositors should not be
given any preferences.
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institutions that collect less than the stated value of the assets purchased as a
result of these defenses. However, because the focus of the healthy bank
paradigm is on better managed banks, more effective supervision of bank
activities, and efforts to reduce the inherent risk in the banking business, the
number of failures and the amount of "secret" agreements which reduce the net
assets realizable upon failure, should be substantially reduced. In any event it
is time to depart from the fixation on the importance of the liquidity of the
insurance fund and instead make pragmatic ethical decisions based on fairness.
The risk of "secret agreements" will then be spread among the participants and
the public at large, rather than resting solely on the innocent borrower.
The repeal of Section 1823(e) and overruling of D'Oench and its progeny
will return normalcy and predictability to bank failure resolution. Additionally,
it will generate public confidence in the integrity of the system by instilling both
procedural and substantive fairness in the resolution of disputes. This article
will now briefly examine the facts of three well-known cases involving the
application of the D 'Oench doctrine and compare their respective results with
the conclusions which would have been reached in those cases under the valuebased analysis developed in this article.
In FederalDeposit Insurance Corporationv. McClanahan,s McClanahan
was a farmer who had briefly served on the board of directors of a local Texas
bank. During his time on the board, Orrin Shaid purchased the bank in the
name of his then-current paramour. Later, after resigning from the board,
McClanahan sought to obtain a loan from this bank to purchase a tractor.
Shaid, representing himself as the bank's owner, persuaded McClanahan to sign
a blank note with the understanding that the terms and conditions would be filled
in later after his loan had been approved.''
Subsequently, upon being
informed by Shaid that the loan had not been approved, McClanahan obtained
a loan from another financial institution to purchase the tractor. He never asked
the first bank or any of its officers for the return of his blank executed note.
Furthermore, unknown to McClanahan, Shaid had filled in terms of the note and
had taken the loan proceeds for himself.
Following the initial bank's insolvency, the FDIC, as receiver, brought suit
against McClanahan seeking to recover on the note. McClanahan asserted the
affirmative defenses of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration.
Following a bench trial in federal court, the judge concluded that McClanahan's

180. FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1986). The facts of the case recited in the
text are taken from this opinion. Id. at 513-14.
181. The appellate court felt that this action was probably negligence on the part of McClanahan
as he apparently knew that Shaid had previously been convicted of bank fraud. Id. at 513.
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defenses were good, and entered judgment in his favor." 2 The Fifth Circuit,
relying on D'Oench, reversed the district court's judgment, holding that
McClanahan's defenses were barred by the rule of estoppel announced in
D'Oench in that he lent himself to a scheme to mislead the banking
authorities.ts The court then remanded the case to the district court for entry
of an appropriate judgement in favor of the FDIC.
In FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation v. Wood,'" a promissory note
in the amount of $12,000 with interest at fifteen percent per annum was
executed at a Michigan bank by Peter Stone and Carole Barnett and guaranteed
by Richard Wood. The note was not paid when it became due. Later, the bank
was placed under FDIC receivership, which entered into a "clean-bank"
purchase and assumption transaction with another Michigan bank. In order to
consummate the purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC in its corporate
capacity purchased from itself, as receiver, the failed bank's unacceptable assets
including the note guaranteed by Wood. The FDIC then filed suit to collect the
note and the defendants asserted that the note was usurious under Michigan
law." Following a jury trial, a verdict was returned finding for the FDIC on
its claim, but also finding that the loan had not been made for business
purposes. Thus, the trial court entered judgment for the FDIC on only the

182. The trial judge rejected the FDIC's D'Oench argument, noting that McClanahan was not
a knowing participant in the alleged scheme. Id. at 514.
183. Id. at 517. The court asserted that McClanahan rather than the FDIC, or the innocent
depositors or creditors of the failed bank, should bear the consequences of his unfortunate
involvement with Shaid. Id. at 516. Although such an assertion has some linguistic merit, the court
was well aware that the innocent depositors were well protected by deposit insurance. It is ironic
that a doctrine whose fountainhead was equity, was applied to reach such inequitable results. The
results in cases such as McClanahan reflect a perversion of the equitable principles upon which
D'Oench was supposedly based. See, e.g., Hymanson, Note, supra note 7, at 318-19 (1988)
("[Clourts have lost sight of the equitable roots of both the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and of
insolvency law in general, and have expanded greatly the protection afforded the bank insurer.").
Q. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991) (asserting that the Court's decision to void a lien
granted by a divorce court to an ex-spouse as part of its division of property, in order to preserve
an exemption for the other spouse under 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1980) is a perversion of the bankruptcy
laws).
184. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). The facts
as stated in the text are taken from this opinion. Id. at 157.
185. Under the law of the state of Michigan, "a loan made by a bank to an individual at an
interest rate of more than seven percent is usurious unless there is a sworn statement specifying the
type of business and the business purpose." Id. at 161 (reference to specific Michigan statute
omitted). In this case the loan was for fifteen percent and no sworn statement was in the bank's
files. Id.
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principal amount of the note."s Later, the trial court granted a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the FDIC awarding it both principal and interest.
The court held that since the FDIC enjoyed a status similar to that of a holder
in due course, it was not subject to the defense of usury under Michigan
law."m The Sixth Circuit affirmed."s The court noted that although Section
1823(e) did not authorize holder in due course status for the FDIC, under
federal common law the FDIC enjoyed that status when it acquired assets
through a purchase and assumption transaction.'" Thus, the court held that
if the FDIC had no actual knowledge of the usury defense prior to the
consummation of the transaction, it acquired the note free of all personal
defenses."9' Notwithstanding the fact that the note was usurious on its face,
the court concluded that there was no evidence that the FDIC had actual
knowledge of the usurious character of the note and thus, it had taken the note
free of that defense.""'
2
In Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation"s
the Supreme
Court held that Section 1823(e) barred the defense of fraud in the inducement
even when the FDIC had actual knowledge of the defense.'" In Langley,
W.T. and Maryanne Langley had borrowed money from a FDIC insured
Louisiana bank to purchase property owned by the insured bank. Later when
the note went into default, the bank instituted suit in state court to collect on the
note. The Langleys removed the case to federal court to be consolidated with
their other suit for damages against the bank.

By way of defense to the bank's suit, the Langleys alleged that certain oral
promises had been made to them by the bank, including a representation that
they would have no personal liability on the note. Furthermore, they alleged
that the bank had misrepresented the acreage being purchased as well as the

186. The jury's finding that the note was not made for business purposes made the note
usurious. However, under Michigan law, that finding only barred collection of the interest not the
underlying debt. Id. at 158 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.32 (West 1978)).
187. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d at 158 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.5 (West 1978)
(providing that a holder in due course is immune from the defense of usury).
188. Id. at 162.
189. Id. at 159.
190. Id. at 160-61.
191. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). The
court noted that following a purchase and assumption transaction there is a rebuttable presumption
that the FDIC did not have knowledge of any defenses. Id. at 161. The court held that the
defendants' assertion that knowledge was apparent from the face of the bank's files was not enough
to overcome this presumption. Id. at 162. It should be noted that there was no evidence that any
of the defendants sought to deceive anyone nor that any of the defendants committed any
misrepresentation or fraudulent act.

192. 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987).
193. Id. at 88-89. The facts recited in the text are taken from this opinion.
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number of mineral acres on the tract. While the suits were pending, the bank
failed, and the FDIC Corporation acquired the Langleys' note following a
purchase and assumption transaction. The trial court granted a summary
judgment for the FDIC finding that Section 1823(e) barred all alleged
defenses."
That opinion was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.'s Affirming
the lower court, Mr. Justice Scalia defined the term "agreement" in Section
1823(e) very broadly to include all of the conditions of performance which were
a part of the original bargain.'" Given this broad interpretation the Court then
held that the bank's fraudulent misrepresentations were agreements under the
statute, and as they were not documented as statutorily required they could not
form the basis of defenses to the action." Even the actual knowledge of the
FDIC of the alleged defenses discovered during an examination prior to
receivership were not relevant to the statute's application."
These three cases are illustrative of fairness concerns raised by the present
expansive nature of D 'Oench and its progeny. A value-based approach to the
same cases would likely yield different results. First, in McClanahan, the
judgment of the trial court would stand because the defenses of failure of
consideration or fraud in the inducement were valid state law defenses and were
satisfactorily proven. In Wood, judgment would be entered on the jury's verdict
granting the FDIC recovery of the principle amount of the note, but denying it
recovery of interest pursuant to Michigan law. Finally, in Langley, the case
would have to be tried to a jury to determine whether the Langleys' defenses
could be established. If so, the Langley defendants would defeat recovery on
the notes.' 9 In each case the pragmatic value-based approach is to permit the
collective values as recognized in the local community through validly enacted
statutes and the intuitive fairness evaluation of the finder of facts resolve these
problems as if no FDIC intervention had occurred. Substantive state law rights
are to be vindicated by a jury of defendant's peers.
As we have seen in the above explanation of a value-based approach to
asset liquidation, the ultimate cost to the FDIC of failure resolution may be

194. Planters Trust & Say. Bank v. Langley, 615 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La. 1985), affid sub
nom. Langley v. FDIC, 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), affid, 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
195. FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
196. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 91. Thus, the failure of the bank to perform a promise that
was a condition of the Langleys' performance would be an agreement which would have to comply

with the statutory requirements.
197. Id. at 93.
198. Id. at 89, 93. The Court in effect used Section 1823(e) to make the FDIC a holder indue
course. See Hymanson, Note, supra note 7, at 309.
199. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 1948, 1953-1954 (West 1987) (establishing that fraud may
vitiate consent). See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Twin City Say. Bank, 868 F.2d 725 (5th
Cir. 1989).

1992]

FAILED BANK POLICY

523

greater than if D'Oench and its progeny prevail.2 ° However, the results
reached are fairer and will lead to restored public confidence in the procedural
and substantive integrity of the banking system by treating individuals after
failure, the same as if the failure had not occurred. Thus, defenses normally
available under state law would not be extinguished by the appointment of the
FDIC as receiver following insolvency, but would continue through the
insolvency proceeding subject to proper pleading, proof, and burden of
persuasion as in any trial proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the nearly fifty years since Justice Douglas placed the albatross of bank
failure upon the neck of the unwary innocent borrower, the entire system of
banking regulation has come under valid criticism for its increasing social costs
and its failure to promote public confidence in the basic integrity of the system.
Although the system of deposit insurance has successfully deterred
macroeconomic crises and achieved a stable money supply, it has encouraged
excessive risk taking by banks and has resulted in bank failures.
The economic preoccupation of bank failure policies with the preservation
of the liquidity of the insurance fund in order to resolve the increasing numbers
of failures has led to a policy debacle. Instead of facing and attempting to
resolve the microeconomic problems of individual bank risk, the failed bank
paradigm has continued to focus on ex post "least cost" failure resolution while
its sacred insurance fund has expired in the strangle hold of bankruptcy. The
D'Oench doctrine, an integral part of this failed bank paradigm, has placed
economic values on a pedestal, effectively trumping ethical values of common
decency and fair play in a seemingly never ending struggle to preserve the
insurance fund.
As this country strives to refocus its efforts toward promoting healthier
banks by attacking the problem of credit risk head-on, the time has come to let
this albatross and the policies of the failed bank paradigm drop away." Too

200. Each of these cases involved a situation where the alleged defense would have had the
effect of reducing the net asset recovery by the FDIC. A more troublesome problem exists in the
situation where the borrower asserts an affirmative claim against the insolvent institution. However,
as shown above, FIRREA limits recovery even in those cases to the amount the claimant would have
recovered in the event of liquidation. See supra note 44.
201. Many years ago Samuel Taylor Coleridge poetically described the release from the burdens
and sins of life as follows:
The self-same moment I could pray;
And from my neck so free
The Albatross fell off, and sank
Like lead into the sea.
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long have bank borrowers borne the sins of banking failure into the wilderness
of their own financial reversals. Too long has the FDIC been able to shift the
cost of its failures to the innocent. The concept of commutative justice reflects
the inherent awareness that each participant in a transaction is responsible and
accountable for his own actions, and that such actions are to be judged in light
of principles of fairness representing the collective values of the community in
which one lives. The time has come for the scapegoat debtor to come before
the altar with bank regulators and bank officials and be sacrificed and held
accountable exclusively for his own sins and failure, not the sins and failures of
the credit system and its regulators as a whole.
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